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THE  CRIMINALIZATION  OF  COMPLIANCE
Todd Haugh*
ABSTRACT
Corporate compliance is becoming increasingly “criminalized.”  What began as a means of
industry self-regulation has morphed into a multi-billion-dollar effort to avoid government inter-
vention in business, specifically criminal and quasi-criminal investigations and prosecutions.
In order to avoid application of the criminal law, companies have adopted compliance programs
that are motivated by and mimic that law, using the precepts of criminal legislation, enforcement,
and adjudication to advance their compliance goals.  This approach to compliance is inherently
flawed, however—it can never be fully effective in abating corporate wrongdoing.  Criminalized
compliance regimes are inherently ineffective because they impose unintended behavioral conse-
quences on corporate employees.  Employees subject to criminalized compliance have greater oppor-
tunities to rationalize their future unethical or illegal behavior.  Rationalizations are a key
component in the psychological process necessary for the commission of corporate crime—they
allow offenders to square their self-perception as “good people” with the illegal behavior they are
contemplating, thereby allowing the behavior to go forward.  Criminalized compliance regimes
fuel these rationalizations, and in turn, bad corporate conduct.  By importing into the corpora-
tion many of the criminal law’s delegitimizing features, criminalized compliance creates space for
rationalizations, facilitating the necessary precursors to the commission of white collar and corpo-
rate crime.  The result is that many compliance programs, by mimicking the criminal law in
hopes of reducing employee misconduct, are actually fostering it.  This insight, which offers a new
way of conceptualizing corporate compliance, explains the ineffectiveness of many compliance
programs and also suggests how companies might go about fixing them.
INTRODUCTION
In 2001, the Harvard Business Review published a profile of Intel’s anti-
trust compliance program.  The article described how the company’s aggres-
sive approach to compliance, which had become an “integral element in the
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chip maker’s business strategy,” allowed it to avoid the type of litigation and
regulatory intervention that was miring rival Microsoft at the time.1  Accord-
ing to the authors, Intel’s compliance efforts provided a “valuable model for
any enterprise that may come under regulators’ scrutiny.”2
The centerpiece of the program was Intel’s “active approach” to compli-
ance.  The brainchild of CEO Andy Grove and general counsel Tom Dunlap,
active compliance mimicked the actions of aggressive regulators seeking evi-
dence of corporate illegality. 3  After employees were trained in the “basic
dos and don’ts” of antitrust—no price fixing, no exclusive contracts, no talk-
ing to competitors about pricing strategies—the legal department would con-
duct random audits of employee files.4  Beginning with senior managers and
“fann[ing] out through the company,” Intel lawyers would “swoop in” and
seize papers, disks, and emails, anything that might be demanded by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of Justice (DOJ) during an
actual investigation.5  If any irregularities were found, the seized materials
would be used in a mock deposition of the senior executive in charge of the
offending business unit.  During the deposition, outside attorneys would
cross-examine the executive in front of his or her colleagues, sometimes for
more than an hour, attempting to establish that criminal statutes and regula-
tions had been violated.  Dunlap explained that these role-playing exercises
served as a dramatic wake-up call for lax executives, giving them the experi-
ence of being in the crosshairs of a government investigation.6  “Think about
it: If you see a senior executive being grilled in front of his peers, will you
write memos that will make you squirm?  Will you let your people say things
that will come back to haunt you?”7  Dunlap suggested that Intel’s approach
to compliance was “the world’s best.”8
Now, that hardly seems the case.  Since the early 2000s, Intel has been
embroiled in one of the largest and longest-running antitrust sagas in history.
First came lawsuits by Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) alleging that Intel was
engaged in wide-ranging anticompetitive behavior concerning the sale of
microprocessors.  In 2009, Intel settled its almost decade-long litigation with
AMD—“the computer industry’s most bitter legal war”—by agreeing to pay
its competitor $1.25 billion.9  Next was a series of investigations by the FTC
contending that Intel “waged a ‘systematic campaign’” to cut off rivals’ access
1 David B. Yoffie & Mary Kwak, Playing by the Rules: How Intel Avoids Antitrust Litigation,
79 HARV. BUS. REV. 119, 120 (2001).
2 Id.
3 See id. at 121–22.
4 Id. at 121.
5 Id.
6 See id. at 121–22.
7 Id. at 122.
8 Id. at 120.
9 Steve Lohr & James Kanter, A.M.D.-Intel Settlement Won’t End Their Woes, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/technology/companies/13chip
.html?_r=0.
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to markets.10  In 2010, Intel signed a consent decree with the agency banning
the company from engaging in future abusive antitrust practices.  And in
2014, Intel lost its appeal of a $1.44-billion fine imposed by the European
Commission, the largest antitrust penalty ever imposed on a single
company.11
But most telling was the lawsuit filed against Intel by the New York State
Office of the Attorney General (NYAG).12  The suit made public the first
detailed accounts of how Intel executives attempted to cover up their
anticompetitive behavior.  In one email, after discussing the need to “kick”
competitors out of “the major . . . companies,” an Intel executive warned
against using such “strong language,” because it might “come under anti-
trust scrutiny.”13  In other emails, executives implored colleagues to be care-
ful about what they wrote because “[t]his is a very serious issue” and to
“[please] delete after reading.”14  This led the NYAG to conclude that not
only was Intel’s compliance program ineffective, but that it contributed to
the company’s illegal behavior.  “Whatever the intention,” the complaint
read, “the actual effect of the program was to school Intel executives in cover-
up, rather than compliance.”15
But if that is true, and Intel’s once-lauded compliance program had
become a tool of corporate misconduct, it begs the question: How is it that a
compliance program could be a national model of effectiveness, but at the
same time facilitate corporate illegality?
The answer to that question is what this Article explores.  Drawing from
criminological, behavioral ethics, and organizational legitimacy research, this
10 Grant Gross, US FTC Files Formal Antitrust Complaint Against Intel, PCWORLD (Dec. 16,
2009), http://www.pcworld.com/article/184822/article.html.
11 James Kanter, European Court Upholds $1.44 Billion Fine Against Intel, N.Y. TIMES (June
12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/business/international/european-court-
upholds-1-06-billion-fine-against-intel.html.  Ironically, this was mentioned offhandedly in
the HBR profile as a “recently initiated [antitrust] investigation.”  Yoffie & Kwak, supra
note 1, at 122.  In 2011, Intel also paid $1.5 billion to Nvidia, a graphics rival, whom it
harmed. See Jason Mick, Intel Settles ‘09 NY Antitrust Case for Only 5 Hours Worth of Its Yearly
Profit, DAILYTECH (Feb. 11, 2012), http://www.dailytech.com/Intel+Settles+09+NY+Anti
trust+Case+for+Only+5+Hours+Worth+of+its+Yearly+Profit/article23979.htm.  In total, at
least six government regulatory bodies representing thirty nations found that Intel
engaged in anticompetitive behavior to preserve its market share. See Roger Parloff, An
Insider’s View of AMD’s War with Intel, FORTUNE (May 2, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/
05/02/an-insiders-view-of-amds-war-with-intel/.
12 New York v. Intel Corp., 827 F. Supp. 2d 369 (D. Del. 2011).
13 Complaint at 19, New York v. Intel Corp., No. 09-827 (D. Del. Nov. 4, 2009) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
14 Id. at 20.
15 Id. at 19.  In November 2009, Intel reached a largely positive settlement with the
NYAG, requiring no changes in the way the company does business and paying only $6.5
million to “cover some of the costs incurred” by the government in prosecuting the case.
Eric Savitz, Intel Settles Antitrust Suit with N.Y. Attorney General, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2012), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/ericsavitz/2012/02/09/intel-settles-antitrust-suit-with-n-y-attorney-
general/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Article contends that corporate compliance is becoming increasingly
“criminalized”; that is, corporations are now approaching compliance prima-
rily through a criminal law lens, using the precepts of criminal legislation,
enforcement, and adjudication to advance their compliance goals.  This can
be seen in the Intel example, in which concerns over possible government
intervention in the company’s affairs resulted in a compliance regime that
functioned like an ever-present criminal investigation.  But the phenomenon
of “criminalized compliance” is not an isolated one.  Intel’s approach, and its
resulting failure, reveals a broader truth about how compliance operates in
corporate America.  After decades of scandal-driven legislation aimed at
curbing corporate wrongdoing, companies have increasingly adopted crimi-
nal law-driven, deterrence-based compliance protocols to avoid criminal and
quasi-criminal investigations and prosecutions.16  These protocols have
become criminalized because the criminal law is the primary paradigm
through which they are derived and implemented.
The problem with approaching compliance through a criminal law lens
is that it can never be fully effective in abating corporate wrongdoing.  That is
because criminalized compliance suffers from an inherent flaw: it imposes
unintended behavioral consequences on corporate employees.  These conse-
quences stem from how employees facing criminalized compliance regimes
rationalize their future unethical or illegal behavior.  Rationalizations are the
key component in the psychological process necessary for the commission of
corporate and white collar crime—they allow potential offenders to square
their self-perception as “good people” with the illegal behavior they are con-
templating, thus allowing bad conduct to go forward.17
Criminalized compliance fuels these rationalizations, and in turn, bad
corporate behavior.  By virtue of its origins in and fidelity to the criminal law,
criminalized compliance imports many of the criminal law’s delegitimizing
features into the corporation—from vague and overlapping rules, to aggres-
sive and onerous monitoring, to inconsistent enforcement and adjudication.
Employees recognize this illegitimacy and incorporate it into their own
thought processes, thus creating an environment ripe for rationalizations.
Once rationalizations take hold, there is little stopping an employee from
committing an unethical or illegal act, regardless of the compliance program
in place.  The result is that many compliance regimes, by mimicking the
16 See generally Lynn S. Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar.–Apr. 1994, at 106, 106, 109–11 (discussing rules-based compliance grounded in
deterrence theory and its limitations).
17 See generally Vikas Anand et al., Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of
Corruption in Organizations, 18 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 39, 40–44 (2005) (discussing how
employees perpetrating corrupt acts engage in “rationalizing tactics” and identifying six
tactics); Joseph Heath, Business Ethics and Moral Motivation: A Criminological Perspective, 83 J.
BUS. ETHICS 595, 602–11 (2008) (suggesting that bureaucratic organizations “might consti-
tute peculiarly criminogenic environments” and discussing how that fosters rationaliza-
tions); Shadd Maruna & Heith Copes, What Have We Learned from Five Decades of
Neutralization Research?, 32 CRIME & JUST. 221, 228–34 (2005) (providing an overview of
rationalization/neutralization theory).
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criminal law in hopes of reducing employee misconduct, are actually helping
to create it.  This insight, which offers a new way of conceptualizing corpo-
rate compliance, not only helps explain the ineffectiveness of many compli-
ance programs, but also how corporations might go about fixing them.
Part I of this Article explains what corporate compliance is, its goals, and
how it has evolved over the past half-century.  This Part demonstrates the
influence criminal law has had on compliance and how it is being shaped by
the application of the criminal law.  Part II discusses the consequences of this
evolution at the governmental, organizational, and individual level.  The
cumulative result is that compliance now shares many features of the crimi-
nal law, including the negative aspects of its enforcement and adjudication,
which leads to the delegitimization of compliance programs in the eyes of
corporate employees.  Part III explains how this delegitimization fuels
employee rationalizations, enabling the commission of unethical and illegal
acts and undermining the goals of compliance.  The Article’s Conclusion
offers a brief sketch of how corporate compliance might be reconceptualized
in light of the above, the aim being to make it more effective at identifying
and eliminating corporate wrongdoing.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
Although many think of corporate compliance as a recent phenomenon,
its origins are at least a half-century old.18  Since the 1960s, companies have
been actively engaged in compliance and risk management.19  Over time,
compliance has evolved from basic self-regulation to complex internal corpo-
rate structures responding to specific changes in the criminal law.  The result
of this “quiet revolution” is a contemporary compliance function typified by
its criminalized nature.20
A. Corporate Compliance Defined
Before delving into the evolution of corporate compliance, it is impor-
tant to understand what compliance is.  Although definitions vary, most com-
18 Corporate codes, one of the basic elements of compliance programs, have been
linked to concepts dating back to ancient Rome, the “birthplace of the corporation.”  Har-
vey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A
Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1574 (1990).  More modern
notions of compliance, particularly self-regulation, predate the American economy and go
back to at least the Middle Ages. Id. at 1576.  Some view compliance as originating much
later with the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. See Robert C. Bird & Ste-
phen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J.
203, 210 (2016).  This Article will focus on corporate compliance regimes operating from
the 1960s to the present.
19 See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949,
961–62 (2009) (tracing the origins of modern compliance to the early 1960s); Bird & Park,
supra note 18, at 210–11 (same).
20 Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2075, 2077 (2016).
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mentators have embraced a variation of the following: “ ‘Compliance’ is a
system of policies and controls that organizations adopt to deter violations of
law and to assure external authorities that they are taking steps to deter viola-
tions of law.”21  Put more succinctly, compliance is a set of processes compa-
nies use to ensure that employees “do not violate applicable rules,
regulations or norms.”22
Together, these definitions make explicit two areas of focus for corpo-
rate compliance regimes.  The first is deterring violations of law, which may
be criminal, quasi-criminal, or civil in nature.  On the criminal side, compli-
ance officers build and administer programs to prevent violations of state
and federal laws prohibiting mainstay corporate and white collar crimes such
as money laundering, bribery, antitrust, and fraud.23  Because companies are
broadly responsible for the criminal acts of their employees through respon-
deat superior liability, compliance efforts attempt to deter individual criminal
behavior.24
Companies also create systems to prevent regulatory violations.  These
regulations, promulgated by government agencies with investigatory and
enforcement power, can be considered quasi-criminal because they often
form the basis of concurrent criminal and civil liability.25  For example,
banks must comply with a host of regulations enforced by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comp-
troller of Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.  A civil
enforcement action by one of these agencies often portends criminal investi-
21 Baer, supra note 19, at 958.
22 Geoffrey P. Miller, The Compliance Function: An Overview 1 (Nov. 18, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=25276
21.  Professor Sean Griffith offers a more norm- and behavioral-focused definition:
“[C]ompliance is the set of internal processes used by firms to adapt behavior to applicable
norms.”  Griffith, supra note 20, at 2082.  A fourth definition, albeit somewhat circular,
states that compliance is “creating and managing policies and procedures around ethics
and compliance to uncover and prevent misconduct.”  Michele DeStefano, Creating a Cul-
ture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71,
87 (2014); see Joseph E. Murphy, Policies in Conflict: Undermining Self-Policing, 69 RUTGERS U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2, 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2
.cfm?abstract_id=2827324, for a broader definition of compliance and its practical
evolution.
23 See Griffith, supra note 20, at 2082; see also, e.g., PFIZER, THE BLUE BOOK: SUMMARY OF
PFIZER POLICIES ON BUSINESS CONDUCT 15–16 (2015) [hereinafter BLUE BOOK], https://
www.pfizer.com/files/investors/corporate/bluebook_english.pdf (describing the com-
pany’s anti-bribery and anti-corruption policies with reference to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA)).
24 See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 18, at 1570–74 (discussing the history of corpo-
rate criminal liability based on the doctrine of respondeat superior).
25 See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 24 (1997) (“[I]n cases arising under the securities laws, and under
many other regulatory regimes, there is often no distinction between what the prosecutor
would have to prove to establish a crime and what the relevant administrative agency or a
private plaintiff would have to prove to show civil liability.” (footnote omitted)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 7 22-MAR-17 13:02
2017] the  criminalization  of  compliance 1221
gation and prosecution by the Department of Justice.26  Indeed, regulators
and prosecutors, particularly in the federal system, work in tandem to
enforce the at least 10,000—but possibly upwards of 300,000—regulatory
provisions that expose companies to overlapping civil and criminal liability.27
On the purely civil side, compliance officers are guarding against actions
from both self-regulatory organizations (SROs) and private litigants.  SROs,
such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) or the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, act as the “private police officers of [the] financial sys-
tem.”28  While these organizations do not have the explicit powers of a gov-
ernment agency, they can and do investigate and sanction members for rules
violations.  For example, FINRA ordered Barclays Capital to pay more than
$13 million in restitution for failing to prevent “unsuitable switching”
between mutual funds by its customers.29  In addition, compliance programs
attempt to prevent employee violations of tort-based statutes and regulations
concerning workplace harassment and discrimination, occupational health,
privacy, environmental protection, and healthcare.30  These claims are raised
through traditional private litigation and can expose companies to significant
financial penalties and litigation costs.31
The second area of focus for corporate compliance regimes is norm gen-
eration.  Compliance programs attempt to deter corporate wrongdoing by
“generating social norms that champion law-abiding behavior.”32  That
26 For example, the Bank Secrecy Act requires banks to have anti-money-laundering
programs with explicit compliance functions. See Miller, supra note 22, at 11.  Failure to
comply with these provisions can be the source of criminal and civil liability. See 31
U.S.C.A. § 5318(h) (West 2015); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a) (West 2015).
27 See Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: New Approaches to a Growing Problem, 102 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529, 531 n.10 (2012); see also Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy U.S.
Attorney Gen., Remarks at American Banking Association and American Bar Association
Money Laundering Enforcement Conference (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-american-bank-
ing-0 (announcing revisions to the U.S. Attorney’s Manual to reflect the importance of
“hav[ing] our criminal prosecutors and our civil attorneys working together”).
28 William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 5 (2013).
29 Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA Sanctions Barclays Capital, Inc.
$13.75 Million for Unsuitable Mutual Fund Transactions and Related Supervisory Failures
(Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2015/finra-sanctions-barclays-capital-
inc-1375-million-unsuitable-mutual-fund-transactions.  FINRA penalties include censure,
fine, or even permanent disbarment from the securities industry. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY
AUTH., FINRA MANUAL §§ 2010, 8310 (2015), http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/dis-
play_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=607.
30 Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New
Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 467 (2008); see also, e.g., BLUE BOOK, supra
note 23, at 37–38 (discussing company policies regarding sexual harassment and racial
discrimination and referencing U.S. and international law).
31 See Miller, supra note 22, at 11 (discussing the effect that private litigation such as
shareholder derivative suits has on compliance programs).
32 Baer, supra note 19, at 960.  A definition of norm-based compliance is “the processes
by which an organization seeks to ensure that employees and other constituents conform
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behavior includes following external laws as discussed above, but also refers
to abiding by internal company rules and culture.  Norms fill the gaps left by
more formal statutory and regulatory enforcement mechanisms.  A com-
pany’s norms exert pressure on employees to forgo wrongdoing by imposing
reputational and other personal costs on transgressors.33  Many consider
norm generation to be the “ethical culture” aspect of corporate compliance,
and a majority of companies consider fostering ethics and creating an ethical
business culture to be the end goal of their compliance programs.34
In order to achieve legal deterrence and positive norm generation, com-
pliance programs operate in three overlapping spheres.  The first is educa-
tion, where all “compliance begins.”35  Compliance professionals start by
explaining to employees what the applicable laws and company norms are
and how to comply with them.36  This is principally accomplished through
the drafting of formal codes of conduct, corporate policies, and organiza-
tional procedures.37  Employees are then trained on these policies by compli-
ance or human resources personnel, the aim being to ensure that employees
can apply the policies to their day-to-day work.38  In essence, compliance edu-
cation and training is “policy-setting” by the company for its employees.39
Monitoring, the second sphere, is aimed at ensuring corporate policies
are understood and followed, and that any violations are quickly identified.
Monitoring can be both direct and indirect.  Direct monitoring begins at the
hiring stage when employees are screened for past instances of wrongdoing
to applicable norms.” GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT,
AND COMPLIANCE 3 (2014).
33 Baer, supra note 19, at 960; see also Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of
Conduct, 4 AM. L. & ECON REV. 227, 232 (2002).  Social norms are often more powerful
than legal proscriptions. See Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS.
L.J. 417, 438–39 (2003) (describing how norms expressed by Enron’s culture overrode
internal rules and external laws).
34 Griffith, supra note 20, at 2093–94, 2094 n.73; see also THOMSON REUTERS, TOP 5
COMPLIANCE TRENDS AROUND THE GLOBE IN 2016 (2016), https://risk.thomsonreuters
.com/content/dam/openweb/documents/pdf/risk/infographic/top-5-compliance-
trends-around-globe-2016-infographic.pdf (fifty-eight percent of businesses surveyed
reported that building a culture of integrity was the ultimate goal of their compliance
program).
35 Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance
with the Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. REV. 71, 81.
36 Baer, supra note 19, at 960; Griffith, supra note 20, at 2093.  Some call this the
advising function of compliance.  James A. Fanto, Advising Compliance in Financial Firms: A
New Mission for the Legal Academy, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 9 (2013).
37 Langevoort, supra note 35, at 81; Fanto, supra note 36, at 9–10, 12.
38 See Gretchen A. Winter & David J. Simon, Code Blue, Code Blue: Breathing Life into
Your Company’s Code of Conduct, 20 ACCA DOCKET, no. 10, 2002, at 73, 82.
39 Baer, supra note 19, at 960; see also Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 411, 450 (2008) (explaining that “inside counsel’s duties have formally
expanded to include training employees about potential liability . . . [and] planning and
design of corporate compliance programs”).
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and company “fit.”40  On the job, employees are subject to regular monitor-
ing of their behavior through informal interactions with their supervisors and
peers, as well as formal performance reviews.41  Indirect, or third-party, mon-
itoring is a half-step removed.  It includes telephone and email hotlines,
mobile compliance apps, ombudsmen, and outside consultants and auditors,
all of which are aimed at detecting and reviewing wrongdoing.42
If monitoring identifies a compliance risk or lapse, the company will
likely initiate an internal review.  This investigatory function of compliance
may be independent of, parallel to, or in close connection with an investiga-
tion by an outside agency.43  Most large organizations have set protocols for
addressing routine violations of company rules, which are generally handled
in-house.44  More involved investigations, ones that are “large-scale
inquir[ies] associated with violations that are serious, systematic, or likely to
result in government enforcement actions,” will almost assuredly involve
outside legal counsel.45  Because private employers are not subject to many
of the constitutional limitations placed on government, and employees gen-
erally do not have an expectation of privacy at work, company investigations
may be onerous on employees.46  A company may read its employees’ emails,
listen to their phone calls, monitor their Internet activity, videotape them,
confiscate their work, and interview them without providing counsel or dis-
closing the company’s suspicion; and at the end of the investigation, all of
the information gathered may be turned over to the government.47
40 Langevoort, supra note 35, at 81; Miller, supra note 22, at 13.
41 Langevoort, supra note 35, at 81.
42 Id. at 82; Miller, supra note 22, at 14.  Some consider this the “reporting function”
of compliance because it allows employees to “safely report concerns to their managers
and [ensures] information concerning potential violations is quickly related to the appro-
priate level in the organization.”  Griffith, supra note 20, at 2095.  Indirect monitoring is
key because it guards against intimidation, collusion, and conflicts of interest that exist in
most hierarchical organizations.  For example, many conflicts occur because “the primary
supervisor with respect to . . . compliance is usually the same person who supervises and
evaluates economic productivity, [and] whose compensation (usually) is based to a sub-
stantial extent on the net returns generated by his or her team.”  Langevoort, supra note
35, at 81–82.
43 Baer, supra note 19, at 960–61; see also Kim, supra note 39, at 450 (noting that inside
counsel’s duties also include “monitoring ongoing compliance practices”).
44 Fanto, supra note 36, at 10; Miller, supra note 22, at 14.
45 Miller, supra note 22, at 14.  Involving outside counsel transfers control over the
inquiry and its costs from compliance personnel to others, but it is often necessary and
prudent when facing future agency scrutiny. Id.; see also Todd Haugh, The Most Senior Wall
Street Official: Evaluating the State of Financial Crisis Prosecutions, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 153,
162–64 (2015) (describing how the monitoring and investigation of an employee for fraud
quickly transformed into an external investigation and enforcement by the SEC and DOJ).
46 Miller, supra note 22, at 14.
47 Id. at 14–15; see also Bruce A. Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated Internal Investiga-
tions: Achieving Fairness for Corporate Constituents, 54 B.C. L. REV. 73, 86–91 (2013) (describ-
ing internal investigations and the pressures on employees to cooperate).
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The third sphere of compliance is enforcement.  Eventually, employees
who have violated the law or company norms will be discovered and disci-
plined.  The form this takes varies based on the severity of the offense, but
most companies recognize a compliance program “will not be fully living and
breathing unless it has teeth.”48  The most common punishment for a signifi-
cant compliance violation is termination.49  In fact, many consultants urge
companies to “fire quickly” if there are any compliance lapses.50  For serious
wrongdoing, the threat of termination is just the beginning; cooperation by
the company with a regulatory agency exposes employees to formal censure,
fines, debarment, and even prison.
B. Corporate Compliance Evolved
While the overarching goals of compliance have largely remained static
over the years, its focus has evolved.  This evolution, which can be broken
into four distinct eras, has led to the current state of increasingly criminal-
ized compliance.
The first era of corporate compliance was one of self-regulation.  Prior
to the 1960s, compliance was largely a matter of business regulating itself.
Following the model of merchant and craft guilds, many industries in the
growing American industrial economy “sought to maintain an orderly way of
life by regulating the conduct of members, [and] providing for their social
welfare.”51  This occurred largely in response to society’s distrust of corpora-
tions; to overcome it, industry leaders used self-regulation to boost corporate
reputations by improving the public interest.52  Self-regulation increased
after the 1929 stock market crash, as banks were urged to practice better self-
governance to serve society and “every member of their guild.”53  These
48 Winter & Simon, supra note 38, at 84.
49 See Griffith, supra note 20, at 2097; Miller, supra note 22, at 15.
50 Bruce Weinstein, Hiring and Firing Lessons from the Toshiba Scandal, FORTUNE (July 24,
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/24/toshiba-hiring-firing/.  Such “zero-tolerance poli-
cies” increased during the post-Enron era but have always impacted mid-level executives
and lower-level employees more so than those in the C-suite. See Landon Thomas, Jr., On
Wall Street, a Rise in Dismissals over Ethics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2005), http://www.nytimes
.com/2005/03/29/business/on-wall-street-a-rise-in-dismissals-over-ethics.html?_r=0
(describing the dismissal of two senior investment bankers over sharp business practices).
51 Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 18, at 1576 (footnotes omitted).
52 Id. at 1577, 1577 n.93; see also Deven R. Desai, The Chicago School Trap in Trademark:
The Co-Evolution of Corporate, Antitrust, and Trademark Law, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 551, 562–63
(describing how corporation law in the late 1800s limited corporate activity to protect
society).
53 Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 18, at 1577 n.93 (quoting JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 184 (1982)).
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industry-wide ideas filtered down to the codes and creeds of individual
businesses.54
Of course, not all self-regulation was for the public’s benefit.  The “first
generation” of American industry self-regulated in order to divide markets
and control prices.55  When government stepped in, industry reformulated
its self-regulation to stave off more sweeping legislation.56  These swings
between government regulation and corporate self-regulation were common
in an era that saw corporations greatly expand their role in society.57
Indeed, compliance has always included a balance between government- and
industry-initiated regulation.  Some of this is driven by corporate self-interest,
but it also reflects the realities of governmental oversight of business—gov-
ernment is simply unable to supervise all industries and their myriad compa-
nies and employees at all times.58  Thus, the “self-government” model of
regulation was seen as necessary for areas in which “self-government, and self-
government alone, can effectively reach.”59  Pre-1960s, these areas of busi-
ness were quite broad.
Much of that changed beginning with the second era of compliance.
The hallmark of this era, which stretched three decades, was corporate scan-
dal leading to industry-specific compliance responses.  The “electrical cases”
of the early 1960s are illustrative.60  In 1961, a Justice Department investiga-
tion of price-fixing and other anticompetitive behavior in the heavy electrical
equipment industry came to a close.61  The investigation revealed that more
than half a dozen companies, including General Electric, Westinghouse, and
Allis-Chalmers, had agreed to divvy up markets, fix prices, and rig bids to
secure their manufacturing monopolies.62  In all, almost thirty companies
and over forty individuals pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to criminal anti-
54 See George C.S. Benson, Code of Ethics, 8 J. BUS. ETHICS 305, 306 (1989) (analyzing
150 business codes and drawing connections between trade association codes of the 1920s
and later corporate codes).
55 Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 18, at 1577 n.94.
56 Id.
57 See Desai, supra note 52, at 580 (“As rail grew and cost structures prompted consoli-
dation, rail took on a scale comparable to and greater than major parts of the national
government.”).
58 Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 18, at 1577.
59 Id. at 1577 n.96 (quoting SELIGMAN, supra note 53, at 186).  For example, in 1938,
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which created the SEC, was amended to author-
ize the delegation of the regulation of securities brokers to the National Association of
Securities Dealers, a private trade organization. Id. at 1577–78.  The SEC Commissioner at
the time, George Matthews, stated that, “I think if we have any hope that the securities
business is to be put on that high professional plane, we must look to help from within the
industry.” Id. (quoting LEO M. LOLL, THE OVER-THE-COUNTER SECURITIES MARKET 203–04
(4th ed. 1981)).
60 See JED S. RAKOFF & JONATHAN S. SACK, FEDERAL CORPORATE SENTENCING: COMPLI-
ANCE AND MITIGATION § 5.02[1][a] (10th ed. 2012).
61 Id.
62 Id.
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trust charges.63  While corporate scandal on this scale is more commonplace
today, the public was shocked that a “vast section of [the] economy,” and
many of the nation’s largest companies, were involved in illegality.64  So too
were sentencing judges, who levied almost $2 million in fines and sent seven
executives to jail.65
The “dramatic sentencing” of those executives caused businesses around
the country to institute antitrust compliance programs.66  Regulators has-
tened the adoption of these programs by suggesting that “closely supervised
and honestly carried out” compliance regimes would go a “long way toward”
proving that violations were inadvertent.67  Thus, the “modern era” of corpo-
rate compliance was born.  And its paradigmatic cycle—corporate scandal
leading to an industry-specific compliance boom—would be repeated in the
1970s68 and 1980s.69
63 Id. at n.7.
64 Id. (quoting Richard Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy (Part I), FORTUNE, Apr.
1961, at 133) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65 Id.  Twenty-four individuals were given suspended sentences. Id.  Although this
sounds lenient by today’s standards, sentencing white collar offenders to any term of
imprisonment was almost unheard of at the time. Id. at n.15.
66 Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 18, at 1578.
67 Id. at 1581 n.130 (quoting FTC Chairman Paul Rand Dixon).
68 In the mid-1970s, in response to corporate disclosures revealing that approximately
400 companies had collectively made $300 million in illegal payments to secure corporate
benefits, Congress passed the FCPA.  Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 18, at 1582–87; see
also Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An
Update on Enforcement and SEC and DOJ Guidance, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 241, 243 (2013).  Accord-
ing to Congress, the “criminalization of foreign corporate bribery [would] to a significant
extent act as a self-enforcing, preventative mechanism.”  Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note
18, at 1585 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977)).  Although that claim may be a bit
overstated, the statute did have an immediate effect on corporate compliance efforts.  An
academic survey taken in the early 1980s found that passage of the FCPA caused ninety-
eight percent of corporate respondents to review their compliance policies; over sixty per-
cent changed their policies based on the FCPA’s provisions. Id. at 1585 n.157 (citing Ber-
nard J. White & B. Ruth Montgomery, Corporate Codes of Conduct, 23 CAL. MGMT. REV. 80, 80
(1980) (finding that many companies “developed, expanded, or modified their codes of
conduct to demonstrate compliance with the spirit and the letter” of the FCPA)).  The
“flurry of code adoptions” during this time suggests that written codes “effectively had
become [a] mandatory” part of corporate compliance. Id. at 1585–86.
69 In 1988, after a series of prosecutions regarding insider trading at prominent banks,
including that of Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken, Congress passed the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act.  Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 18, at 1587–90.
The Act amended criminal and civil securities laws, requiring broker-dealers to prevent the
misuse of “material, nonpublic information.”  15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78o(g), 80b-4(a) (West
2015).  Just as the adoption of the FCPA increased corporate compliance efforts, so too did
the new regulations, resulting in industry-specific training, monitoring, and enforcement
related to insider trading offenses.  Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 18, at 1590–91 (the
regulations “put[ ] the securities industry itself on the front lines in the fight against
[insider trading]” (quoting 134 CONG. REC. H7,467 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1988) (statement of
Rep. Markey, one of the Act’s sponsors))).
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The 1990s began a new era of compliance with the creation of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations.  This third era has
undoubtedly had the biggest impact on how U.S. companies approach their
compliance function.  During this time, compliance was not only trans-
formed from an industry-specific effort to a mainstream corporate concern,
but it also became a tool by which government more easily intervened in
business.
Promulgated in 1991, the Organizational Guidelines were appended to
the existing sentencing guidelines for individual federal offenders.70  While
the guidelines for individuals focused largely on retribution, the Organiza-
tional Guidelines, acknowledging the practicalities of punishing organiza-
tional offenders, took a different approach.71  Geared toward deterrence,
they focus on imposing appropriate restitution and fines while crediting an
organization for having an already-existing compliance program.  Sometimes
called “duty-based” sentencing, the Organizational Guidelines incentivize
companies to police the criminal conduct of their employees by reducing
corporate fines if firms have an effective program to prevent violations of law,
promptly report wrongdoing, and fully cooperate with the government and
accept responsibility.72  This “carrot and stick approach” was intended to use
criminal sentencing to convert companies from “passive bystanders who
hoped their employees would behave well to active advocates for ethical con-
duct on the job.”73
Although creation of the Organizational Guidelines was important from
a policy standpoint,74 because only roughly 200 companies are convicted and
sentenced each year, the guidelines’ direct reach is limited.75  In addition,
70 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.1 (2014) (setting forth the applica-
bility of chapter 8 to the “sentencing of all organizations”).
71 Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Pro-
moting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 702–03 (2002).
72 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f)–(g); Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 321, 325 (2012).  This has also
been called a “composite liability system” because it holds companies strictly liable for their
employees’ illegal acts, but mitigates the effects of that liability upon a showing that com-
pliance efforts were made.  Baer, supra note 19, at 964 (citing Jennifer Arlen & Reinier
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 692 (1997)).
73 ETHICS RES. CTR., THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS AT
TWENTY YEARS 16 (2012), https://www.theagc.org/docs/f12.10.pdf.  A company with an
effective compliance program that meets the specified criteria of the Organizational
Guidelines can receive a reduction of up to ninety-five percent of its “base fine.” Id. at 22.
74 At the time of their adoption, a majority of the public believed sentences for white
collar and organizational offenders were too lenient. See Murphy, supra note 71, at 700
(citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 162 (1985)).
75 Id. at 698–99 (showing total corporate sentencings from 1996 to 1998 hovering
around two hundred); U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, No. of Organizational Cases over Time,
INTERACTIVE SOURCEBOOK, http://isb.ussc.gov/content/pentaho-cdf/RenderXCDF?solu
tion=Sourcebook&path=&template=mantle&action=fig-
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the DOJ’s recent policy of using deferred and non-prosecution agreements
(DPAs and NPAs) to deter corporate wrongdoing without formally convicting
companies and subjecting them to sentencing has limited the Organizational
Guidelines’ direct reach even more.76
But that does not mean the Organizational Guidelines have had an insig-
nificant impact on corporate compliance.  To the contrary, they represent a
“watershed change in compliance regulation.”77  That is due to how the
Organizational Guidelines codified the minimum criteria necessary for com-
panies to have an “effective” compliance program.  Although the original ver-
sion vaguely stated that effective compliance was key to reducing
organizational culpability, later amendments set forth the specific
“hallmarks” of an effective compliance and ethics program.78  In addition to
these core indicators of effectiveness, the guidelines now also require that
companies periodically assess the risk of the occurrence of criminal
conduct.79
The Organizational Guidelines spurred a massive increase in corporate
compliance efforts.  Companies now had a clear (or at least clearer) mandate
from a government agency of what they should do to mitigate the expansive
liability inherent in a respondeat superior legal regime.  Compliance was no
longer seen as a set of rules specific to particular industry regulations as dur-
ing the antitrust, FCPA, and insider trading eras.  Instead, the Organizational
Guidelines made corporate compliance “a broad issue for organizations gen-
erally worthy of substantial attention” because it lessened culpability across all
ure_xx.xcdf&table_num=Figure_Z01 (last visited Jan. 24, 2017) (indicating the same for
the period from 2006 to 2013).
76 Arlen, supra note 72, at 326–28; see also BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL 6–7
(2014) (describing the rise of deferred and non-prosecution agreements and its
ramifications).
77 Bird & Park, supra note 18, at 212; see also Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate
Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 690 (2008) (calling the Orga-
nizational Guidelines “the most important influence” in compliance).
78 See Philip A. Wellner, Effective Compliance Programs and Corporate Criminal Prosecutions,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 500–02 (2005).  Effective compliance is judged on the following
criteria:
(1) standards and procedures to prevent and detect criminal conduct;
(2) responsibility at all levels of the program, together with adequate program
resources and authority for its managers;
(3) due diligence in hiring and assigning personnel to positions with substantial
authority;
(4) communicating standards and procedures, including a specific requirement
for training at all levels;
(5) monitoring, auditing, and non-retaliatory internal guidance/reporting sys-
tems, including periodic evaluation of program effectiveness;
(6) promotion and enforcement of compliance and ethical conduct; and
(7) taking reasonable steps to respond appropriately and prevent further miscon-
duct upon detecting a violation.
See id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)–(b).
79 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(c).
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potential violations.80  This breadth only increased when the Delaware Court
of Chancery indicated that corporate directors might violate their fiduciary
duties by failing to adopt compliance programs consistent with the Organiza-
tional Guidelines.81  Every company—and every director—was now on the
hook for implementing a guidelines-based compliance program.
Of course, this also increased the role of government agents, particularly
federal prosecutors, in compliance.  For prosecutors, the Organizational
Guidelines became the “foundational document” necessary to assess corpo-
rate culpability.82  If a company is convicted of wrongdoing, the guidelines
act as the formal measure of culpability, as well as the benchmark for any
future court-imposed monitoring.83  Short of an indictment, the guidelines
serve both as an arbiter of whether a deferred or non-prosecution agreement
is appropriate, and as the template for reforms to a company’s compliance
program if an agreement is reached.84  Either way, government agents—
criminal prosecutors and regulatory agency staff—are directly involved in
assessing, commenting on, and possibly recrafting a company’s compliance
program using the Organizational Guidelines as a guide.85
In addition, the Justice Department has issued a series of memoranda
setting forth the principles on which prosecutors should make corporate
charging decisions.86  These memoranda largely follow the dictates of the
Organizational Guidelines—voluntary disclosure, full cooperation, and “the
existence and adequacy of [a] corporation’s compliance program” deter-
mine a company’s criminal culpability.87  Although the focus and explicit
80 Bird & Park, supra note 18, at 212; Ford & Hess, supra note 77, at 690 (suggesting
that the Organizational Guidelines “pushed compliance programs out of the defense
industry, beyond limited issues such as antitrust and the FCPA, and into the mainstream”).
81 In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996); see Ford &
Hess, supra note 77, at 690 (discussing the impact of Caremark on the increase in compli-
ance efforts); Murphy, supra note 71, at 713–14 (same).  Although it has been debated
exactly what liability Caremark imposed on corporate directors, subsequent decisions have
largely settled the issue. See Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 719, 730–33, 733 (2007) (stating that Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006),
“makes clear that when a board fails to implement compliance and monitoring systems or
fails to respond to red flags, it fails to act as a faithful and loyal monitor” (footnote
omitted)).
82 Griffith, supra note 20, at 2086.
83 Ford & Hess, supra note 77, at 686–90.
84 Baer, supra note 19, at 966.
85 See infra Section II.A.
86 See Griffith, supra note 20, at 2087; Murphy, supra note 71, at 712 (these memo-
randa were issued in the wake of the Guidelines).
87 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, on Bring-
ing Criminal Charges Against Corps., to Dep’t Component Heads & U.S. Attorneys (June
16, 1999), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/
charging-corps.pdf.
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terms of each memorandum vary, all draw from the principles outlined in
the Organizational Guidelines.88
Federal regulators, following their DOJ counterparts, also factor in
whether companies have effective Organizational Guidelines-style compli-
ance programs when making enforcement decisions.89  For example, during
a debarment proceeding, agents might use as a mitigating circumstance
whether a company “has implemented ‘effective standards of conduct and
internal controls.’”90  More specifically, the SEC’s Seaboard Report sets forth
a list of criteria the agency may consider in determining whether and how
much to credit corporate behavior.91  The criteria echo much of that found
in the guidelines and the associated DOJ memos.92  In short, regardless of
the agency involved, the Organizational Guidelines set the parameters of
what is required of corporate compliance.93  Not surprisingly, companies
have reacted by implementing compliance policies focused on satisfying
those parameters.94
88 For example, the Holder Memo, unlike the Organizational Guidelines, does not
specify the elements of an effective compliance program. See id.  But, subsequent memo-
randa building on it clearly signal what actions companies should take to avoid criminal
charges, including those related to compliance. See Memorandum from Mark. R. Filip,
Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys
(Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-
memo-08282008.pdf (discussing changes to charging guidelines for corporate fraud prose-
cution); Press Release, Office of the Deputy Attorney Gen., Justice Dep’t Revises Charging
Guidelines for Prosecuting Corporate Fraud (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2008aug28_DOJ
corpchargeguidepressrelease.authcheckdam.pdf (stating that the Filip memorandum pro-
vides that “prosecutors may not consider whether a corporation has sanctioned or retained
culpable employees in evaluating whether to assign cooperation credit to the corpora-
tion”).  New memoranda are quickly digested by attorneys and compliance professionals
and then incorporated into the monitoring and enforcement spheres of compliance
programs.
89 Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 892 (2007).
90 Murphy, supra note 71, at 713 (quoting H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s
Compliance Oversight Responsibility in the Post-Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 101 (2001)
(“Furthermore, if the misconduct constitutes cause for debarment, the corporation may
avoid debarment by virtue of having previously implemented an effective compliance pro-
gram and a system of internal controls.”)).
91 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 44969, REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND
COMMISSION STATEMENT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION TO AGENCY ENFORCEMENT
DECISIONS, (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter SEABOARD REPORT], https://www.sec.gov/litiga-
tion/investreport/34-44969.htm.
92 Id. (setting forth thirteen criteria that the SEC “will consider in determining
whether, and how much, to credit self-policing, self-reporting, remediation and
cooperation”).
93 See generally Garrett, supra note 89, at 897.
94 See Murphy, supra note 71, at 710–11 (discussing the broad impacts of Organiza-
tional Guidelines within companies); Paine, supra note 16, at 109 (explaining the “compel-
ling rationale” for companies to follow the Organizational Guidelines, creating an
emphasis on prevention through surveillance, control, and punishment).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 17 22-MAR-17 13:02
2017] the  criminalization  of  compliance 1231
If the Organizational Guidelines era was a watershed, the current era
may be the “golden age.”95  This fourth era of corporate compliance began
roughly in 2000 and is exemplified by unprecedented corporate scandal and
equally unprecedented governmental response.  The largest scandals of the
early part of the decade are well known—Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia,
HealthSouth—but their scale is worth recalling.  At the time of its collapse,
Enron was valued at approximately $70 billion and employed upwards of
20,000 people;96 and WorldCom was valued at $107 billion and was the
United States’ second largest long-distance telephone company.97  By the
end of 2002, after both companies were implicated in vast financial account-
ing frauds, WorldCom and Enron became the first and second largest bank-
ruptcies in U.S. history.98  As staggering as those numbers are, they seem
almost quaint in light of what occurred at the end of the decade.  In Septem-
ber 2008, Lehman Brothers became the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history at
almost $613 billion,99 and the financial crisis that Lehman’s collapse tipped
off is estimated to have been a $22-trillion event.100
The legislative and regulatory response to this “perfect storm” of scandal
and crisis has been unparalleled.101  In July 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
became law, which “marked a major revision of the federal securities laws.”102
Although the act contained a series of criminal and civil provisions related to
corporate governance, most important for compliance purposes was its
“explicit requirement” that public companies adopt codes of conduct.103
95 Jeffrey M. Kaplan, Semi-Tough: A Short History of Compliance and Ethics Program
Law 3 (May 16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://webcache.googleusercontent
.com/search?q=cache:qt8Pvm7MsG4J:conflictofinterestblog.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/06/Rand-Kaplan-White-Paper-post-publication4.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&
client=safari.
96 The Enron Scandal by the Numbers, USA TODAY (Jan. 21, 2002), http://usatoday
30.usatoday.com/money/energy/2002-01-22-enron-numbers.htm; The Fall of Enron, NPR,
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/enron/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
97 Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, Worldcom’s Collapse: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES (July
22, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/us/worldcom-s-collapse-the-overview-
worldcom-files-for-bankruptcy-largest-us-case.html.
98 Id.  It is estimated that Enron and WorldCom caused a combined $35-billion loss to
the economy in the first year of their demise alone. CAROL GRAHAM ET AL., THE BROOKINGS
INST., POLICY BRIEF NO. 106, COOKING THE BOOKS: THE COST TO THE ECONOMY  (2002),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/pb106.pdf.
99 Erik Larson, Lehman Recovery Seen as Justifying $2 Billion Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-11/lehman-recovery-
seen-as-justifying-2-billion-bankruptcy.
100 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL CRISIS LOSSES AND
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/
651322.pdf.
101 RAKOFF & SACK, supra note 60, § 5.02[1][f].
102 Id.
103 Id.  Some suggest that section 404 is the most significant compliance provision
because it requires management to maintain a sound internal-control structure for finan-
cial reporting and to assess its effectiveness. See Stephen Wagner & Lee Dittmar, The Unex-
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Accordingly, pursuant to section 406 of the Act, the SEC mandated that bro-
ker-dealers, investment advisors, investment companies, and banks disclose
whether senior officers were governed by a corporate code.104  Although leg-
islation in previous compliance eras initiated large-scale prophylactic adop-
tion of compliance codes by companies, Sarbanes-Oxley was different in that
it made adoption of codes compulsory.105  No additional substantive viola-
tions were necessary to punish corporations for their lack of compliance
efforts.106
In addition, section 805 directed the Sentencing Commission to revise
the Organizational Guidelines to ensure that they were “sufficient to deter
and punish organizational criminal misconduct.”107  The Commission took
the directive to heart, raising penalties for corporate offenders and further
clarifying what constitutes an effective compliance program.  As Miriam Baer
explains:
[T]he Sentencing Commission explicitly included provisions for board over-
sight and for compliance programs to educate employees on the importance
of corporate ethics.  As evidenced by the Commission’s claims at the time,
the reforms were intended to transform corporate governance by improving
corporate culture.  “Cultural corporate governance” in turn would result in
more compliance and less crime.108
Although the Commission’s predictions would be proven wrong by the
looming financial crisis, the revisions to the Organizational Guidelines cer-
tainly “put[ ] the onus of adequate compliance on the board of directors and
top-level management”—they are now the ones tasked with being knowledge-
able about the company’s compliance program and overseeing its
effectiveness.109
pected Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2006), https://hbr.org/2006/04/the-
unexpected-benefits-of-sarbanes-oxley.
104 RAKOFF & SACK, supra note 60, § 5.02[1][f].  The SEC also required companies to
disclose if their codes were being amended or waived for those officers. See Integrated
Disclosure System for Small Business Issuers, 17 C.F.R. § 228 (2005); Standard Instructions
for Filing Forms Under Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Energy
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975—Regulations S–K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2014); Forms,
Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 249 (2014).
105 RAKOFF & SACK, supra note 60, § 5.02[1][f].
106 See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Penalizes Investment Advisers for
Compliance Failures (Nov. 28, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-248
.htm (reporting three investment advisers charged with failing to put into place proce-
dures designed to prevent securities law violations).  After the SEC revised its policies,
other agencies and SROs followed suit. See Kaplan, supra note 95, at 4 (stating new compli-
ance-related requirements adopted by the NYSE and NASDAQ).
107 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 cmt. background (2014) (quoting
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 805(a)(5), 116 Stat. 745).
108 Baer, supra note 19, at 965 (footnotes omitted).
109 RAKOFF & SACK, supra note 60, § 5.02[1][g]; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2) & app. 2, 3.
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Further, the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010,110 the sweeping
legislative response to the financial crisis, led to additional criminal and
quasi-criminal regulations aimed at compliance.  On the criminal side, the
Act expands existing laws such as the Commodity Exchange Act to include
previously unregulated transactions.111  On the quasi-criminal side, the Act
requires investment advisors to designate a chief compliance officer responsi-
ble for implementing procedures to prevent violation of the Investment
Advisers Act.112  Failure to do so subjects companies to both criminal and
civil sanctions.113  Although the compliance-aimed regulations of the Act are
still unfolding, “it is clear that Dodd-Frank has placed additional emphasis on
the effectiveness of organizations’ internal reporting [and compliance] pro-
cedures.”114  As expected, companies have ratcheted up their compliance
programs to meet these new concerns.115
So where are we now?  Whether the golden age of compliance is nearing
an end, and what era may come after, is unclear.  But it is clear that the “law
and practice of corporate compliance has evolved greatly” since the 1960s.116
What started as straightforward corporate self-regulation has transformed
into a compliance structure driven by the cycle repeated each of the last five
decades—corporate scandal, followed by public outcry, followed by criminal
investigation and prosecution, followed by sweeping criminal and quasi-crim-
inal legislative response, all culminating in increased compliance efforts.
This cycle has embedded the criminal law, and its precepts, into corporate
compliance.  The result is that compliance is becoming “a creature of federal
criminal law”—it is becoming criminalized.117
110 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
111 Jennifer G. Chawla, Criminal Accountability and Wall Street Executives: Why the Criminal
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act Fall Short, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 937, 951–52 (2014) (dis-
cussing various criminal provisions of Dodd-Frank).
112 See Compliance Procedures and Practices, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)–7 (2012); see also
Bird & Park, supra note 18, at 213.
113 TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, CRIMINAL PROVISIONS IN THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM
& CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 2–6 (2010), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/
criminal-provisions-in-the-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-consumer-protection-act.  In addi-
tion, the Act directed the Sentencing Commission to revisit the Organizational Guidelines
once again, resulting in further clarification of how companies should appropriately
respond to employee misconduct. See Rebecca Walker, The Evolution of the Law of Corporate
Compliance in the United States: A Brief Overview (March 2014), in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND
ETHICS INSTITUTE 2014, at 87, 101 (Theodore L. Banks & Rebecca Walker eds., 2014).
114 Walker, supra note 113, at 117.
115 See Bird & Park, supra note 18, at 213 (discussing new duties of chief compliance
officers); Abha Bhattarai & Catherine Ho, Four Years into Dodd-Frank, Local Banks Say This Is
the Year They’ll Feel the Most Impact, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/business/capitalbusiness/four-years-into-dodd-frank-local-banks-say-this-is-the-year-
theyll-feel-the-most-impact/2014/02/07/12c7ca48-877e-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story
.html (reporting regulation’s impact on banks).
116 Walker, supra note 113, at 136.
117 Baer, supra note 19, at 972.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 20 22-MAR-17 13:02
1234 notre dame law review [vol. 92:3
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINALIZED COMPLIANCE
If the evolution of corporate compliance is indeed resulting in its
increased criminalization, it is important to understand the consequences of
that evolution.  This Article suggests that criminalized compliance regimes
impact governmental, organizational, and individual actors in a number of
ways, which ultimately leads to the larger behavioral consequence at the
heart of this Article.  Criminalized compliance delegitimizes the compliance
function so as to foster employee rationalizations, thus facilitating the very
corporate wrongdoing compliance is intended to prevent.
A. Criminalized Compliance Invites Government Agents into the Corporation
The preceding Section demonstrates the significant role the criminal
law plays in corporate compliance.  This of course means that the Depart-
ment of Justice, and government regulatory agencies more generally, also
play a significant role in compliance.118  How that came to be from a histori-
cal standpoint is largely explained above, but a discussion of some additional
specifics, and more importantly, the consequences stemming from that role,
is warranted.  Put simply, criminalized compliance invites government agents
into corporations.
How this happens is a function of two related phenomena.  The first is
familiar: the growing number of white collar and corporate criminal laws.
William Stuntz explained this fundamental truth more than fifteen years
ago.119  According to Stuntz, the expansion of criminal statutes since the
1850s, but particularly in the recent past, has created criminal laws that are
“deep as well as broad: that which they cover, they cover repeatedly.”120
Stated another way, the sheer number of federal criminal codes has created a
set of overlapping circles, such that a single criminal act could be treated as
though the offender committed many different crimes.121
This feature of modern criminal law—its “depth and breadth”—consoli-
dates power in prosecutors and government agents.122  One way this happens
118 See Garrett, supra note 89, at 855 (describing power of federal prosecutors in corpo-
rate prosecutions and corporate compliance); Griffith, supra note 20, at 2092 (arguing that
the government, specifically federal prosecutors, have been “the leading force in the devel-
opment of compliance”).
119 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
519–20 (2001).  Although there has been some nibbling around the edges of Stuntz’s find-
ings, no one has seriously challenged them in the fifteen years since they were made. See
Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of Criminal Law,
62 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (2012) (providing some empirical support for the argument that the
number of federal crimes has had little effect in the “real world of federal criminal justice
enforcement”).
120 Stuntz, supra note 119, at 518.
121 Id. at 518–19.
122 Id. at 519–20.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 21 22-MAR-17 13:02
2017] the  criminalization  of  compliance 1235
is that lawmaking shifts from legislatures to “law enforcers.”123  Because the
criminal law is so expansive, it cannot be enforced as written; there are simply
too many violations to prosecute.124  Therefore, decisions about enforce-
ment fall on the law enforcers in the executive branch, primarily prosecutors
and their agency counterparts.  This results in enforcement “on-the-street”
that differs from the “law-on-the-books.”125  Stuntz explained that this is the
“criminal justice system’s real lawmak[ing]”—government lawyers and regu-
latory agents making law through their enforcement choices, not legislatures
through traditional democratic governance.126
The other way power is consolidated in law enforcers is that they, not
courts, adjudicate crime.  With so many overlapping criminal statutes and
regulations to choose from, prosecutors and agents have available to them a
range of crimes that govern the same conduct.127  They can investigate and
charge a wrongdoer with the easiest crime to prove, the crime with the high-
est penalty, or—by stacking multiple charges—both.  This allows enforce-
ment of the laws “more cheaply,” thereby lowering the costs of conviction,
primarily through forcing plea and settlement agreements.128  Government
agents are “not so much redefining criminal law . . . as deciding whether its
requirements are met, case by case.”129
Although Stuntz’s observations were aimed at the criminal justice system
as a whole, he might as well have been focusing on corporate and white collar
crime.  A 2010 report found that at the end of 2007 there were at least 4450
federal criminal statutes; there are likely more than 5000 now.130  Add to that
the estimated 300,000 federal administrative regulations that can be
enforced criminally, many of which are targeted at business-related conduct,
and the massive size of the criminal code becomes clear.131  Notably, white
collar and corporate crime underwent the biggest expansion of federal law in
123 Id. at 519.  This group includes prosecutors and FBI agents, but also regulatory
agency attorneys and investigators, such as those at the SEC.  Any government agent with
jurisdiction to enforce criminal or quasi-criminal statutes or regulations qualifies as a “law
enforcer” under Stuntz’s conception.  See id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 521.
126 Id. at 506.
127 Id. at 519.
128 Id. at 519–20.
129 Id. at 519.
130 See John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, 26 LEGAL MEMO.
1, 1–2 (2008) (finding that Congress creates approximately five hundred crimes per dec-
ade).  Between 2002 and 2007, Congress created, on average, one new crime per week, for
each week of each year. Id. at 1; see also Shana-Tara Regon, White Collar Crime Policy, 38
CHAMPION 49 (2014).
131 Podgor, supra note 27, at 531 n.10; see also Stuntz, supra note 119, at 513–14
(explaining the growth of the criminal code); George J. Terwilliger III, Under-Breaded
Shrimp and Other High Crimes: Addressing the Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1419 (2007) (cataloging problems caused by the “explosive growth
in federal regulatory prosecutions” and how changing legal doctrines have made it easier
to prosecute corporations).
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three of the past five decades.132  This is largely a product of the cycle dis-
cussed above—each new corporate scandal results in the passage of criminal
legislation meant to combat it.
Take for example a statute mentioned earlier, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
After Enron’s collapse and Arthur Anderson’s indictment for destroying evi-
dence of the company’s wrongdoing, lawmakers were “anxious to participate
in the national response” to the “growing financial crimes epidemic.”133  So
Congress created two new obstruction of justice provisions as part of the
Act—18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c) and 1519.134  As a result, there are now five over-
lapping federal obstruction crimes—some redundant, all wide in scope—
applicable to white collar and corporate offenders.135
Prosecutors have used this redundancy and expansive scope in predict-
able ways.  Last term, the Supreme Court heard Yates v. United States,136 a case
in which federal prosecutors were faced with a small-town commercial fisher-
man who threw a crate of undersized red grouper overboard, against a fish
and game officer’s instructions.137  The government could have elected to
decline prosecution, letting stand a civil citation issued to Yates for catching
the fish.138  Instead, prosecutors indicted him for three felonies: destroying
property to prevent a federal seizure in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a);
destroying the undersized fish—an alleged “tangible object” under Sarbanes-
Oxley—to impede an investigation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519; and mak-
ing a false statement to a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a)(2).139  Although the precise issue before the Supreme Court was
whether Yates was deprived of fair notice that the destruction of fish fell
within the meaning of § 1519, the case highlighted the issues of overcriminal-
132 Stuntz, supra note 119, at 525.  Not everyone agrees this expansion is problematic.
See Klein & Grobey, supra note 119, at 5; Kip Schlegel et al., Are White-Collar Crimes Over-
criminalized? Some Evidence on the Use of Criminal Sanctions Against Securities Violators, 28 W. ST.
U. L. REV. 117, 140 (2001) (finding that while there has been an increase in criminal
sanctions for securities offenses, it was consistent with the increase in the cases initiated).
133 Lucian E. Dervan, White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence, Plea Bargaining, and the
Loss of Innocence, 101 KY. L.J. 723, 727 (2013).
134 The provisions are largely redundant; they cover essentially the same conduct,
requiring only slightly different mental states. Id. at 729–30 (comparing the text of each
provision).
135 These individual offenses can be imputed to the corporation through respondeat
superior liability.  This is precisely what happened in the Arthur Anderson case. See Kurt
Eichenwald, Enron’s Many Strands: The Investigation; Andersen Charged with Obstruction in
Enron Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/15/busi-
ness/enron-s-many-strands-investigation-andersen-charged-with-obstruction-enron.html?
pagewanted=all.
136 Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
137 Brief for the United States at 6–8, Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (No. 13-7451).
138 John Yates, A Fish Story, POLITICO MAG. (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2014/04/a-fish-story-106010.html.
139 Brief for the United States, supra note 137, at 8.
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ization and prosecutorial discretion.140  In fact, during oral argument, an
exasperated Justice Scalia asked the government, “What kind of a mad prose-
cutor would try to send this guy up?”141
The prosecutor was not exactly mad; he was maximizing his “lawmaking”
function.  Both §§ 1519 and 2232(a) covered exactly the same conduct—
throwing the fish overboard.  Prosecutors charged Yates with § 1519 because
it carries a twenty-year statutory maximum, as opposed to § 2232(a)’s five-
year maximum.142  But they also charged § 2232(a) because it has the weak-
est mens rea requirement—all the government had to show was that Yates
knowingly destroyed property subject to seizure.143  By stacking the charges
this way, prosecutors got the benefit of an easily provable violation, with the
leverage provided by a possible twenty-year sentence.144  The ability of agents
and prosecutors to choose among broadly worded, overlapping statutes when
charging individuals, and then to use the threat of significant punishments to
pressure agreements, exemplifies how government agents maximize their
enforcement and adjudicatory powers.145
The second phenomenon that increases the role of government agents
in corporations flows from the first.  Prosecutors and regulators have lever-
aged their power to more easily charge and convict individual white collar
offenders, and through them their companies, in attempted reformations of
corporate culture.  Brandon Garrett terms this approach “structural reform
prosecution,” and it describes the Justice Department’s willingness to use the
criminal law as a means of influencing the inner-workings of companies.146
Instead of focusing on convictions, prosecutors and their agency counter-
parts use deferred and non-prosecution agreements to “reshape the govern-
ance of leading corporations.”147
Again, an example coming out of the Enron scandal illuminates the gov-
ernment’s approach.  After the prosecution of Arthur Anderson, which many
believed caused the accounting firm’s demise, the Justice Department refor-
mulated its enforcement policies for corporations.  In what became known as
the “Brooklyn Plan,” prosecutors strategized an approach that allowed them
to investigate and punish corporate crime without risking the fate of compa-
140 Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1100 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“That brings to the surface the real
issue: overcriminalization and excessive punishment in the U.S. Code.”)
141 Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (No. 13-7451).
142 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519, 2232(a) (2012).
143 See 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a).
144 For how this plays out in more traditional white collar and corporate cases, see
Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy
of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 608–18 (2005).
145 See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 766–67 (2005); Dervan, supra note 133, at
751–52; Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 795
(2012).
146 Garrett, supra note 89, at 854.
147 Id. at 936.
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nies and the resulting public backlash.148  Using a model taken from juvenile
proceedings, companies would agree to cooperate with the government, pay
hefty fines, and reform their ways, all “in exchange for a conditional promise
[by the DOJ] not to prosecute.”149  Thus, corporate deferred and non-prose-
cution agreements were born.150
These agreements are now widely used.  In 2014, the Department of Jus-
tice entered into thirty deferred and non-prosecution agreements with com-
panies, up from two in 2000.151  Between 2000 and 2014, over 300
agreements were entered into, compared to just thirteen in the nine years
prior to 2001.152  And no wonder—companies benefit from the agreements
by limiting their exposure, both as to further investigation and future crimi-
nal liability.  In addition, companies ensure they will not suffer the collateral
consequences that may be triggered by a conviction.153  Prosecutors also like
these agreements because they dramatically “reduce the costs associated with
prosecutorial action.”154  While there is still the cost of investigation, “there
are no trials, no risk of los[ing], and no collateral consequences” to innocent
employees and stockholders that might upset the public.155
The rise in use of deferred and non-prosecution agreements to address
corporate wrongdoing is rooted in something deeper than a prosecutor’s
fear of losing a trial or raising the public’s ire, however.  Most prosecutors use
these agreements because they genuinely believe they are having an
148 GARRETT, supra note 76, at 55; Griffith, supra note 20, at 2088.
149 Griffith, supra note 20, at 2088.
150 As Garrett puts it, “The new approach suggested that corporations were more like
juveniles—not entirely innocent, but mainly in need of guidance, rehabilitation, and
supervision.” GARRETT, supra note 76, at 55.  This strategy was formalized (and then refor-
mulated) in the series of DOJ memos described above. See supra text accompanying notes
87–89.
151 GIBSON DUNN, 2015 MID-YEAR UPDATE ON CORPORATE NON-PROSECUTION AGREE-
MENTS (NPAS) AND DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (DPAS) 2 chart 1 (2015) [herein-
after 2015 MID-YEAR UPDATE], http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2015-
Mid-Year-Update-Corporate-Non-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-Agree
ments.aspx.  The yearly high was forty, which occurred in 2010. Id.
152 See id.; David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1308 (2013).
153 See Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight
of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1864, 1873 (2005)
(describing how prosecutors entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with Pruden-
tial Securities over allegations of fraud related to oil and gas sales, allowing the firm to
continue its investment advising activities).
154 Griffith, supra note 20, at 2088.  Further, deferred and non-prosecution agreements
“simultaneously offer[ ] the prospect of large monetary recoveries from corporate defend-
ants.” Id.  In 2012, the total payout under these agreements was $9 billion, three times the
amount in 2011. 2015 MID-YEAR UPDATE, supra note 151, at 2 chart 2.  The total for just the
first half of 2015 was over $4 billion, almost equaling the previous year’s total of over $5
billion. GARRETT, supra note 76, at 68–69; 2015 MID-YEAR UPDATE, supra note 151, at 2
chart 2.
155 Griffith, supra note 20, at 2088.
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impact—that they are changing corporate culture for the better.156  This
belief is demonstrated by the terms of the agreements themselves, which
prosecutors draft with the help of regulatory agents.157  The focus of the
agreements is often not the large fines, but what changes a company will
make to ensure laws are not broken in the future.  For example, while Pfi-
zer’s 2009 deferred prosecution agreement related to its illegal marketing of
the painkiller Bextra contained an eye-popping $2.3-billion charge, the bulk
of the agreement focused on corporate governance and compliance.158
Indeed, most agreements contain provisions aimed at refining corporate pol-
icies and procedures, and improving employee training and monitoring—
two of the three spheres of compliance.159  SEC enforcement action settle-
ments often include equally detailed reform-oriented provisions.160
While these practices may indeed change corporate cultures for the bet-
ter,161 they also allow prosecutors into the corporation.  Prosecutors have
become “super-regulators” by “expanding the prosecutorial scope [of law
enforcement] and interweaving compliance matters with criminal mat-
ters.”162  By maximizing their enforcement and adjudicative power, provided
by expansive federal criminal law, government agents now directly intervene
in compliance matters through the terms of DPAs and NPAs,163 allowing
them to “impose affirmative obligations on companies to change personnel,
revamp their business practices, and adopt new models of corporate govern-
156 Judge Jed Rakoff, Senior District Judge from the Southern District of New York, has
forcefully articulated this argument, albeit in regards to why no senior Wall Street execu-
tives have been convicted for conduct occurring during the financial crisis. See Jed S.
Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-
crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/?pagination=false.
157 GARRETT, supra note 76, at 68 (demonstrating that in ninety-one percent of DPAs or
NPAs, a regulatory agency was involved, most commonly the SEC).
158 Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/03/business/03health.html?_r=0 (explaining
that the company entered into a corporate integrity agreement aimed at helping the com-
pany avoid future illegality).
159 Griffith, supra note 20, at 2089.  Some agreements call for detailed corporate
changes, such as hiring new compliance professionals, closing a business line, or altering
compensation practices. Id.
160 See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange Commission,
2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 793, 796 (describing SEC “undertakings” that require the “crea-
tion of new management positions, adoption of new accounting and reporting practices,
reconfiguration of corporate training programs, and establishment of specific board-level
committees and procedures”).
161 Some argue this is not the case. See Garrett, supra note 89, at 936 (offering praise
for structural reform prosecutions aimed at specific factors in companies that encourage
illegal behavior, but also finding a cause for concern); see also Barnard, supra note 160, at
794–96 (same).
162 Hillary Rosenberg & Adam Kaufmann, The Pros and Cons of DOJ Hiring a Compliance
Expert, LAW360, (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/689277/the-pros-and-
cons-of-doj-hiring-a-compliance-expert.
163 Griffith, supra note 20, at 2109.
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ance.”164  Thus, irrespective of their intentions, prosecutors, and by exten-
sion regulatory agents, have found their way deep into America’s
corporations through compliance.  This is an important development in cor-
porate and white collar criminal law, and it directly impacts how companies
approach their core compliance function.165
B. Criminalized Compliance Increases Organizational Focus on Keeping
Government Agents Out of the Corporation
Companies facing the prospect of increasing governmental intervention
in their business, either through broad investigations of criminal or quasi-
criminal wrongdoing, or through settlement agreements that direct future
compliance efforts, want to minimize the possibility of that happening.  As
Jayne Barnard has reported, “everybody hates” government intrusion into
their company.166  While that is undoubtedly true, it is important to under-
stand what companies want to avoid and why.  And it is equally important to
understand how companies have shaped their compliance efforts to achieve
that goal.
From a company’s perspective, it is trying to avoid three primary effects
of government intervention.  First, no company wants to be convicted of
criminal wrongdoing by the DOJ or admit to an SEC violation.  While this is
largely true because of the reputational and monetary costs the firm will
incur, which are explored below, there are also more direct reasons.  One is
that convictions and judgments trigger collateral consequences that may
drastically alter a company’s future.  The most explicit example is a company
whose business involves selling or providing services to the government; a
conviction may bar future government contracts and effectively put the com-
pany out of business.167  Even if a company is not entirely dependent on
government contracts, a conviction and resulting debarment could impact
revenues so significantly that it might put the company in peril.  Arthur
Anderson succumbed to collateral consequences;168 British Petroleum’s U.S.
operations might have too if it were formally debarred based on convictions
164 Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow, Introduction to PROSECUTORS IN THE BOAR-
DROOM 1, 3 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011); see infra Section II.B.
165 See Garrett, supra note 89, at 936 (stating that “[t]he move towards a structural
reform approach is . . . the most important development in decades in the law of organiza-
tional crime”).
166 Barnard, supra note 160, at 817 (quoting Interview with Anonymous Source 1 (Sept.
26, 2007; Nov. 15, 2007)).
167 See Marc R. Greenberg, Beware: Debarment Can Prove to Be More Damaging than
the Criminal Penalty (Jan. 28, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.musickpeeler
.com/images/ps_attachment/attachment1183.pdf (outlining the collateral consequences
of debarment for convicted companies, particularly those subject to EPA jurisdiction).
168 See GARRETT, supra note 76, at 150 (“The true death sentence for Arthur Anderson
was not the $500,000 fine but the SEC debarment.”); Barkow & Barkow, supra note 164, at
2.
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related to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.169  Although criminal convictions
of large companies are somewhat rare given the Justice Department’s prefer-
ence for deferred and non-prosecution agreements,170 the threat of dire col-
lateral consequences stemming from a conviction is real to most
companies.171
Second, the more pressing concern for companies is less existential than
economic.  Be it a criminal investigation and prosecution by the DOJ or a
lawsuit by the SEC, having the government interested in your business is
enormously expensive.  These expenses include remediating wrongdoing
after a legal violation, mounting a legal defense against criminal or civil
charges, and conducting internal investigations at the outset of an agency
inquiry.  A 2011 study found that multinational companies spend on average
approximately $3.5 million a year on compliance, over twenty percent of
which is allocated to incident management, legal defense, and redress.172
Siemens A.G. reported spending more than $1 billion solely related to the
government’s inquiry into the company’s payment of foreign bribes.173
An even more prominent example is the cost incurred by large banks
related to the financial crisis.  Bank of America estimated that the total cost
of its litigation expenses related to the crisis topped $36 billion.174  Indeed,
the total cost of financial crisis-related litigation for the largest global banks
169 Greenberg, supra note 167, at V-18 (explaining that a conviction-triggered debar-
ment would have prevented BP from renewing oil leases and selling jet fuel to the U.S.
military, resulting in billions of dollars in losses).
170 In addition, even when convictions or judgments do occur, so-called “bad boy provi-
sion” waivers may allow companies to continue operating in highly regulated industries.
See Robert J. Anello & Richard F. Albert, Convicted Corporations Aren’t Really Bad Boys, 253
N.Y. L.J., no. 4, June 2, 2015 (describing how four international banks pleaded guilty to
manipulating foreign exchange rates, subjecting them to significant collateral conse-
quences, but were granted waivers by the SEC to continue operating in the United States).
171 See Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Special Problem of Banks and Crime, 85 U. COLO. L. REV.
1, 25–27 (2014) (discussing the externalities to corporate prosecutions, specifically regard-
ing banks).  It should also be apparent that no company wants to see its executives go to
jail or be barred from working in the industry.  As a relative matter, however, few execu-
tives are actually convicted of criminal charges. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Crimi-
nal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV.1789, 1805–09 (2015).
172 PONEMON INST., THE TRUE COST OF COMPLIANCE: A BENCHMARK STUDY OF MULTINA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 7 fig.3 (2011), http://www.tripwire.com/tripwire/assets/File/
ponemon/True_Cost_of_Compliance_Report.pdf.  The report estimated the average cost
to firms of non-compliance is $9.4 million. Id. at 2.
173 Peter J. Henning, The Mounting Costs of Internal Investigations, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5,
2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/the-mounting-costs-of-internal-investi-
gations/?_r=0.
174 John Maxfield, We Finally Know How Much the Financial Crisis Cost Bank of America,
MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 26, 2015), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/09/26/we-
finally-know-how-much-the-financial-crisis-cost.aspx.  Bank of America was the largest
player in the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) arena, issuing $637 billion in MBS
between 2005 and 2008. See Matthew Frankel, JPMorgan Chase’s Settlement Was Just the Begin-
ning, MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 26, 2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/01/
26/jpmorgan-chases-settlement-was-just-the-beginning.aspx.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 28 22-MAR-17 13:02
1242 notre dame law review [vol. 92:3
since just 2010 was more than $300 billion.175  And that is just the direct costs
of litigation; that is, settlements and legal fees stemming from criminal and
civil violations.  These figures do not represent business costs incurred
through staffing changes and restructuring that were precipitated by govern-
ment intervention.  In 2012, Bank of America spent $3.1 billion a quarter to
wind down its subprime mortgage business, a move that was largely dictated
by the government’s 2008 intervention in the bank’s affairs.176  The expense
now runs approximately $900 million a quarter.177  Not exactly a minor
cost.178
Even assuming companies are able to absorb the direct costs of govern-
ment intervention, they still face a host of indirect costs.  Companies that are
publicly outed as being under investigation by the DOJ or another govern-
ment agency incur significant reputational costs and loss of market share.179
Just one week after allegations surfaced that Volkswagen was being investi-
gated for installing “defeat devices” to thwart EPA standards, the company’s
stock plunged nearly thirty percent.180  Analysts are questioning whether the
carmaker will ever truly recover from the scandal (which is just beginning to
be investigated by various agencies and will stretch on for years), citing
reputational costs and spillover effects, including the downgrading of com-
pany debt by rating agencies and loss of key personnel.181
Third, companies simply want to avoid the disruption that is inevitable
when government intervenes in business.  This includes small-scale govern-
175 See Ben McLannahan, Banks’ Post-Crisis Legal Costs Hit $300bn, FIN. TIMES, (June 7,
2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/debe3f58-0bd8-11e5-a06e-00144feabdc0.html#ax
zz3q5TEVcrZ.
176 Maxfield, supra note 174; see also Janet E. Kerr, The Financial Meltdown of 2008 and
the Government’s Intervention: Much Needed Relief or Major Erosion of American Corporate Law?
The Continuing Story of Bank of America, Citigroup, and General Motors, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
49, 51–52 (2011) (describing the government pressuring of Bank of America to purchase
Merrill Lynch and its “toxic” subprime assets).
177 Maxfield, supra note 174.
178 Barclays reportedly rejected a DOJ demand for a $5-billion settlement payment
related to wrongdoing during the financial crisis because over the past five years almost all
of the company’s profits have been “erased by 20 billion pounds ($24.5 billion) of miscon-
duct charges.”  Zeke Faux & Hugh Son, Why Barclays CEO Staley Opted for War When Dimon
Chose Surrender, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2016-12-23/why-barclays-ceo-staley-opted-for-war-when-dimon-chose-surrender.
179 See Barnard, supra note 160, at 817 (reporting “adverse signal[s] to the market”
when compliance consultants are included in an SEC settlement); Faux & Son, supra note
178 (quoting Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan CEO, suggesting that if he had not quickly settled
with the DOJ for $13 billion, the health of his company would be threatened).
180 Paul R. La Monica, Volkswagen Has Plunged 50%. Will It Ever Recover?, CNN MONEY
(Sept. 25, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/24/investing/volkswagen-vw-emissions-
scandal-stock/.  The scandal cost Volkswagen $7.3 billion in the third quarter of 2015, and
experts predict total losses of between $20 and $78 billion.  Sue Reisinger, Scandal-Plagued
VW, GM and Deutsche Bank Take Big Hits to Bottom Line, CORP. COUNSEL (Nov. 5, 2015),
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202741772940/ScandalPlagued-VW-GM-and-Deutsche-
Bank-Take-Big-Hits-to-Bottom-Line?slreturn=20160924164431.
181 See La Monica, supra note 180.
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ment inquiries that cause minor workflow disruptions; for example, answer-
ing subpoenas and document requests by government agencies and following
cease and desist orders.182  But it also includes more intrusive intervention,
such as when a court-imposed monitor is tasked with evaluating a company’s
day-to-day compliance with a deferred prosecution, non-prosecution, or set-
tlement agreement.183  In addition to the significant monetary costs of
employing a monitor,184 the monitor’s staff may be attending business meet-
ings, interviewing board members and senior managers, reporting on the
actions of C-suite executives, and engaging in hands-on development of cor-
porate compliance initiatives185—not to mention engaging in what many
companies see as “a bunch of [other] busy work.”186  All this takes time,
energy, and focus away from what employees see as their real responsibilities.
Even without a monitor inside the company, government intervention
can be incredibly disruptive.  For example, KPMG’s sale of illegal tax shelters
resulted in a deferred prosecution agreement that required the company to
close its entire private tax practice.187  A Bristol-Myers Squibb agreement
compelled the company to separate the positions of CEO and chairman of
the board and appoint a new outside board member.188  Other agreements
“micromanage” firms by dictating hiring and firing.189  On the whole, com-
panies find these business disruptions “painful, time-consuming, and colos-
sally expensive.”190
These three effects, and the ease with which prosecutors and govern-
ment agents may trigger them, have caused companies to greatly expand
their compliance programs.  Industry trends tell the story.  Since 2008, com-
pliance “has been [a] real growth business.”191  What a decade ago was a
182 See Barnard, supra note 160, at 799.
183 Ford & Hess, supra note 77, at 680–83.
184 For example, then-United States Attorney Chris Christie directed a monitoring con-
tract to his former boss, John Ashcroft, that allowed Ashcroft’s firm to bill up to $2.9 mil-
lion per month for its monitoring services. See Claire Heininger, Ashcroft’s Firm to Collect
$52m to Monitor Implant Case, NJ.COM (Nov. 20, 2007), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/
2007/11/when_us_attorneys_christopher_c.html; Philip Shenon, Ashcroft Deal Brings Scru-
tiny in Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/10/
washington/10justice.html?pagewanted=all.
185 Ford & Hess, supra note 77, at 706.
186 Barnard, supra note 160, at 817 n.119.
187 See GARRETT, supra note 76, at 72.
188 See id.
189 Barnard, supra note 160, at 818.
190 Id. at 817 n.119 (quoting Interview with Anonymous Source 2 (Sept. 27, 2007)
(speaking explicitly about the appointment of compliance consultants)).  Of course, dis-
ruption of a company’s practices is often exactly what a deferred or non-prosecution agree-
ment is intended to do. See Ford & Hess, supra note 77, at 720 (“[T]he presence of a
monitor can be a sufficiently disruptive force to cause the company to conduct a meaning-
ful re-evaluation of its practices.”).
191 Anthony Effinger, The Rise of the Compliance Guru—and Banker Ire, BLOOMBERG (June
25, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-06-25/compliance-is-now-call-
ing-the-shots-and-bankers-are-bristling.
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relatively unglamorous trade has ballooned into an almost $30-billion indus-
try.192  And the corporate compliance department “has emerged, in many
firms, as the co-equal of the legal department.”193  Recent surveys confirm
that modern compliance departments function with greater authority, orga-
nizational support, and funding than in the past.194
None of this is without cost to corporations.  One study found that for
companies with more than $1 billion in revenue, total compliance costs now
equal that of 190 full-time employees.195  In the securities industry, between
2002 and 2006, compliance-related out-of-pocket expenditures rose a mini-
mum of 88% and a maximum of 473% depending on the type of expense.196
The percent increase for capital expenditures related to compliance was
366%, rising to almost $4 million per firm.197  Recent surveys show compli-
ance budgets are continuing to increase in highly regulated industries.198
Part of the increasing budgets goes to additional compliance staff, which
must be hired to oversee the growing landscape of criminal and quasi-crimi-
nal regulations.  For example, JPMorgan has hired 8000 compliance and con-
trol personnel since the financial crisis;199 HSBC has added 1600.200  Some
large companies hire “hundreds, even thousands, of compliance officers at a
time.”201  As Robert Bird and Stephen Park put it: “Driven by the new regula-
tory environment, a compliance officer is being termed a ‘dream career,’ . . .
[and] [t]here is a ‘battle royal for talent in the compliance space, across the
board.’”202
192 See Dov Seidman, Why Companies Shouldn’t ‘Do’ Compliance, FORBES (May 4, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dovseidman/2012/05/04/why-ceos-shouldnt-do-compli-
ance/.
193 Griffith, supra note 20, at 2077.
194 See, e.g., DELOITTE, IN FOCUS: 2015 COMPLIANCE TRENDS SURVEY 5 (2015), http://
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/regulatory/us-aers-reg-crs-
2015-compliance-trends-survey-051515.pdf.
195 RICHARD M. STEINBERG, THE HIGH COST OF NON-COMPLIANCE: REAPING THE REWARDS
OF AN EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 3 (2010), https://www.securityexecutivecouncil
.com/common/download.html?PROD=238.  Another study found the costs associated
with compliance to be almost $10,000 per employee. See Robert Bird & Stephen Park, An
Efficient Investment-Risk Model of Compliance, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:05 AM),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/11/30/an-efficient-investment-risk-model-of-
corporate-compliance/.
196 SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, THE COSTS OF COMPLIANCE IN THE U.S. SECURITIES INDUSTRY: SUR-
VEY REPORT 10 fig.6 (2006), https://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/research/surveys/cos-
tofcompliancesurveyreport(1).pdf.
197 Id. at 11.
198 See Griffith, supra note 20, at 2103.
199 Effinger, supra note 191.
200 Gregory J. Millman & Samuel Rubenfeld, Compliance Officer: Dream Career?, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023033302045792507221
14538750.
201 Griffith, supra note 20, at 2077.
202 Bird & Park, supra note 18, at 217–18 (footnotes omitted) (citing Millman &
Rubenfeld, supra note 200 (quoting Cory Gunderson, head of the risk-and-compliance
practice at Protiviti, a research consulting firm)).
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But it is not just the increase in cost and number of compliance staff that
explains the organizational consequences of criminalized compliance—it is
who is being hired.  There is no formal credential or educational back-
ground necessary to be a compliance officer, yet sought-after hires tend to be
attorneys and those with legal or regulatory backgrounds.203  This makes
sense given that compliance officers are tasked with “keeping up with increas-
ingly strict and complex regulatory systems,” and then training, monitoring,
and enforcing those systems.204  The optimal skill set naturally skews person-
nel toward lawyers.
For high-level compliance positions the trend is even more pronounced.
Top compliance officers at major corporations are often not just attorneys,
but many are former prosecutors and regulatory agents.  For example, Lum-
ber Liquidators, Target, and Standard Chartered all recently hired attorneys
with audit or regulatory backgrounds to be their chief compliance officers.205
In Standard Chartered’s case, its hire was the top federal prosecutor in Con-
necticut, David Fein.206  While Fein does not have “much banking expertise,”
he did spend time at the DOJ and in the White House, which should help
him navigate the ongoing fallout from the bank’s recent $667 million in fines
for violating U.S. sanctions laws.207  Likewise, Pershing Square Capital Man-
agement recently hired a former Manhattan federal prosecutor to oversee
the hedge fund’s compliance efforts.208  Increasingly, the heads of compli-
ance for major U.S. companies have spent significant time prosecuting,
203 Effinger, supra note 190 (reporting that a chief compliance and ethics officer stated
that “[m]ost of us tend to be auditors or attorneys”); Neil Getnick and the Failure of Law
Driven Compliance Programs, CORP. CRIME REP. (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.corporatecrime
reporter.com/news/200/neil-getnick-failure-law-driven-compliance-programs/ (stating
that “companies typically rely on ‘law-driven’ compliance”); Aruna Viswanatha & Brett
Wolf, Wall Street’s Hot Hire: Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Officers, REUTERS (Oct. 14,
2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2013/10/14/wall-streets-hot-
hire-anti-money-laundering-compliance-officers/.
204 Millman & Rubenfeld, supra note 200.
205 Tomi Kilgore, Lumber Liquidators Hires New Chief Compliance Officer, MKT. WATCH
(Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lumber-liquidators-hires-new-chief-
compliance-officer-2015-08-18; Jonathan Randles, Target Pulls in GM Compliance Chief to
Helm Data Security, LAW360 (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/594467/tar-
get-pulls-in-gm-compliance-chief-to-helm-data-security; Viswanatha & Wolf, supra note 203.
206 Viswanatha & Wolf, supra note 203.
207 See id.  Standard Chartered’s former global head for anti-bribery and corruption,
Hui Chen, is now the Justice Department’s chief compliance officer, the first person to
hold that position.  Sue Reisinger, DOJ Compliance Chief’s Boss Lays out the Agency’s Plans,
CORP. COUNS. (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202741499801/DOJ-
Compliance-Chiefs-Boss-Lays-Out-the-Agencys-Plans.  Chen was hired to “conduct more
exacting interviews of compliance personnel” and “probe what companies are telling us
[the DOJ] about their compliance.”  Yin Wilczek, DOJ’s Compliance Counsel Improving Fraud
Probes: Official, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 9, 2016) (on file with author).
208 Matthew Goldstein, Ex-Federal Prosecutor in New York Joins Ackman’s Hedge Fund, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2015), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/06/ex-u-s-prosecutor-dabbs-
joins-ackmans-pershing-square/?_r=0.
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suing, or investigating other major U.S. companies on behalf of the govern-
ment.  Arguably, these individuals know best how to navigate the government
intervention their companies so desperately want to avoid.
C. Criminalized Compliance Increases Criminal Law-Focused Compliance Efforts
by Individual Compliance Officers
“Over-compliance is the new compliance.”209  That is how Harvey Pitt,
former SEC chairman and now CEO of Kalorama Partners, a firm specializ-
ing in compliance and regulatory risk management consulting, describes his
approach to designing compliance programs.  Pitt further explains that he
tells his corporate clients that “[m]inimal muster is for losers,” counseling
them to “get[ ] ahead of the curve” and optimize their compliance
procedures.210
If this type of heavy-handed approach to compliance sounds like an out-
lier, it is not.  Pitt and other leaders in the compliance industry have capital-
ized on the evolution of criminalized compliance, and their regulatory
backgrounds, to advocate for a compliance approach that is firmly rooted in
principles of criminal law and deterrence.211  While this Article contends
that such an approach is misguided, it has gained traction in corporate
America.  Individual compliance officers are increasingly using deterrence-
based, command-and-control compliance models that are grounded in and
draw from the criminal law.
In many ways this is unsurprising given how compliance has evolved.  A
company facing broad respondeat superior liability for the criminal and quasi-
criminal acts of its employees seeks to avoid that risk.212  The most obvious
way, perhaps, is to formulate a set of rules that align with the source of the
risk—the criminal law.  This approach tends to shape compliance programs
toward a focus on preventing unlawful conduct, “primarily by increasing sur-
veillance and control and by imposing penalties for wrongdoers”—the stan-
dard tools of criminal law enforcement.213
209 Ashlee Vance, Over-Compliance Is the New Compliance, Says Former SEC Chairman, REGIS-
TER (May 18, 2005), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/05/18/pitt_sec_kalorama/.
210 Id.
211 A more cynical view is the following: “Vendors of all types have stapled ‘Compliance’
onto whatever product they find laying around, hoping fear might generate a sale.” Id.
This is reflected in many compliance departments’ focus on “the crisis du jour.”  Griffith,
supra note 20, at 2101 (providing the example of data privacy and confidentiality as “a top
area of attention” for compliance because of recent high profile corporate data breaches).
212 Indeed, a broad view of corporate compliance is that its mission is to minimize all
“downside risk” associated with any employee misconduct or mistake.  Griffith, supra note
20, at 2083.
213 See Paine, supra note 16, at 109.  The Organizational Guidelines’ carrot-and-stick
structure and their emphasis on reducing culpability through the detection of criminal
violations reinforces that focus. See id.; see also Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Preventing Corrup-
tion by Promoting Trust—Insights from Behavioral Science 3, 9 (Univ. of Passau, Working Paper
No. V-69-15, 2015), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286441815_Preventing_
Corruption_by_Promoting_Trust_-_Insights_from_Behavioral_Science (arguing current
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On the level of an individual compliance officer, this plays out as follows:
there is now “deep and broad” white collar and corporate criminal law availa-
ble to government agents.  Those agents use their resulting adjudicatory and
enforcement power to increasingly intervene in business in an attempt to
improve corporate cultures.  When those same agents transition to the pri-
vate sector as highly sought-after compliance professionals, they are faced
with preventing the very governmental intervention they used to lead, which
is enormously costly and disruptive to their new companies.  Accordingly,
there is great organizational pressure on them to predict, prevent, and miti-
gate corporate wrongdoing.214  In order to do so, they fall back on their
training and expertise as lawyers and investigators, treating compliance as a
problem that can be solved with the familiar tools of the criminal law.  And
the most powerful tools government agents possess are those of “law enforc-
ers”—aggressive enforcement and adjudication.
Intel’s “active approach” to compliance provides a compelling example
of how this occurs.  In order to stave off the expense and disruption of anti-
trust investigations and lawsuits, the company, led by General Counsel Tom
Dunlap, developed a compliance program that was modeled on a continu-
ing, and arguably relentless, criminal investigation.  The tactics that became
the program’s centerpiece, and which ultimately led to additional illegality
within the company,215 were the epitome of criminal law-driven, deterrence-
based compliance.
But Intel’s approach is far from unique.  In fact, the monitoring and
enforcement spheres of many U.S. compliance programs follow a similar
approach.216  For example, Morgan Stanley was recently in the news for its
successful FCPA compliance program.  The program, developed by Raja
Chatterjee, global head of the bank’s anti-corruption group and a former
federal and state prosecutor, “won praise from the government” and a rare
public declination concerning bribery payments made by an executive to a
Chinese official.217  Central to the government’s decision to only prosecute
the executive, Garth Peterson, and not the company was Morgan Stanley’s
approaches to combating corruption, including the Organizational Guidelines, focus on
prevention and repression, and are “based on a principle of distrust”); Robert B. Cialdini
et al., The Hidden Costs of Organizational Dishonesty, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Spring 2004, at
67, 72 (explaining the rise in popularity of internal controls and monitoring systems as
based partly on overestimates of their effectiveness).
214 See LRN, THE 2015 ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE EFFECTIVENESS REPORT 14 (2015), http:/
/pages.lrn.com/the-2015-ethics-and-compliance-program-effectiveness-report (discussing
the pressures on compliance officers to justify their departments’ returns on investment).
215 See Complaint, supra note 13, at 19.
216 See Linda Klebe Trevin˜o et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and
What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 137 (1999) (finding deterrence-based compliance
dominates in Fortune 1000 firms).
217 Scott Cohn, Ex-MS Banker in China Bribery Case: My Side of Story, CNBC (Aug. 16,
2012), http://www.cnbc.com/id/48693573 (reporting that the payments were intended to
secure a real estate deal benefiting Morgan Stanley and the executive); see also Howard
Sklar, The Most Marketable Compliance Officer in the World, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2012), http://
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preexisting compliance program, self-disclosure, and extensive coopera-
tion.218  In particular, the government highlighted Morgan Stanley’s “robust”
due diligence program, which included random audits and transaction moni-
toring, extensive employee training regarding FCPA compliance, and fre-
quent updates of its anti-corruption program.219
While these publicly reported efforts are now considered “best practices”
for FCPA compliance, Morgan Stanley also likely benefited in the govern-
ment’s eyes from its more aggressive tactics.220  A review of Peterson’s case
demonstrates that Morgan Stanley’s “compliance personnel regularly surveil-
led and monitored client and employee transactions,” “randomly audited
selected personnel in high-risk areas,” made pretextual phone calls to verify
transactions, and ran criminal background checks on the principals of deal
partners.221  Lanny Breuer, the assistant attorney general at the time, charac-
terized this approach as properly “rigorous compliance” and “smart, and
responsible, enforcement.”222
Another example is JPMorgan.  In response to multiple compliance fail-
ures over the last decade, the bank undertook a major revision of its compli-
ance program.  Some of its efforts are typical of large companies attempting
to forestall future government intervention: the bank “hired 2,500 compli-
ance workers and spent $730 million over the past three years to improve
[compliance] operations.”223  But the bank also took a novel and extremely
aggressive approach to employee monitoring—it created an in-house surveil-
lance unit and developed proprietary software to monitor the email and tele-
phone communications of its traders.224  While employee monitoring, even
high-tech monitoring, has been part of compliance programs for years,
www.forbes.com/sites/howardsklar/2012/04/30/the-most-marketable-compliance-officer-
in-the-world/.
218 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Morgan Stanley Managing Director
Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by FCPA (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-morgan-stanley-managing-director-pleads-guilty-
role-evading-internal-controls-required.
219 See Sklar, supra note 217.
220 Thomas Fox, Morgan Stanley Gets Thumbs Up from DOJ & SEC for Best Practices Compli-
ance Program, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (May 3, 2012), http://corporatecompliancein-
sights.com/morgan-stanley-gets-thumbs-up-from-doj-sec-for-best-practices-compliance-
program/.
221 Information at 6, 10, United States v. Peterson, 859 F. Supp. 2d 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(No. 12-224), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2012/04/
26/petersong-information.pdf.
222 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Speaks
at the New York City Bar Association (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks-new-york-city-bar-association.
223 Hugh Son, JPMorgan Algorithm Knows You’re a Rogue Employee Before You Do, BLOOM-
BERG (Apr. 5, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-08/jpmorgan-
algorithm-knows-you-re-a-rogue-employee-before-you-do.
224 See Portia Crowe, JP Morgan Is Working on a New Employee Surveillance Program, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/jpmorgans-employee-surveillance-
program-2015-4.
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JPMorgan’s efforts are noteworthy because the bank’s software algorithms
attempt to predict illegal trading behavior before it occurs.  This so-called
“predictive monitoring” uses technology that was created specifically to com-
bat terrorism.225  The bank executive in charge of the surveillance program
is Sally Dewar, a former top regulator in the UK’s Financial Services Author-
ity.226  Much like during her regulatory enforcement days, Dewar is hoping
to catch employees that are colluding or concealing their bad intentions, and
then expel or prosecute those employees.  It would be difficult for compli-
ance to be any more criminalized.  Some believe this type of vigorous compli-
ance “offers a glimpse into Wall Street’s future.”227  Given the evolution of
compliance, the pressures facing compliance officers, and those officers’
backgrounds, that future seems likely for many companies.
D. Criminalized Compliance Delegitimizes the Compliance Function
The above examples illustrate a particular irony.  In the quest to avoid
costly government intervention into their businesses, which is a product of
expansive criminal law and aggressive government agents, companies have
turned to those same agents and are now employing the most aggressive
enforcement aspects of the criminal law as part of their compliance efforts.
Irony aside, however, criminalized compliance has important ramifications
for the efficacy of compliance as a whole.  By importing into the corporation
these negative aspects of the criminal law, criminalized compliance regimes
have also imported many of the criminal law’s delegitimizing features.
To understand exactly what these features are, a brief return to Stuntz is
necessary.  Stuntz explained that while it was problematic that expansive
criminal law had transferred lawmaking and adjudication to government “law
enforcers,” there was an additional related consequence.228  If law enforcers
have the power to make and adjudicate the criminal law, then they are the
criminal justice system.229  According to Stuntz, this is a natural consequence
of a structure that allows law enforcers to freely embody the criminal justice
system and use it as they wish.  The inevitable result is the “selective enforce-
ment and unequal treatment of similarly situated defendants.”230  This does
not necessarily occur through intentional bias or vindictiveness; a govern-
ment prosecutor or regulatory agent may simply be enforcing his or her own
225 Son, supra note 223.  Credit Suisse is developing a similar program with Palantir
Technologies, a Silicon Valley tech company focused on data analysis for police and intelli-
gence services.  Jeffrey Voegeli, Credit Suisse, CIA-Funded Palantir to Target Rogue Bankers,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-22/
credit-suisse-cia-funded-palantir-build-joint-compliance-firm.  Palantir has received funding
from In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s investment arm. Id.
226 Son, supra note 223.
227 Id.
228 Stuntz, supra note 119, at 520 (explaining how this consequence was “the most
important of all”).
229 See Luna, supra note 145, at 795; Stuntz, supra note 119, at 519–23.
230 Beale, supra note 145, at 757.
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sincerely held view of morality.231  But it guarantees enforcement and adjudi-
cation of the criminal law that is at best inconsistent and arbitrary, and is at
worst pretextual or discriminatory.232  Some have called these consequences
the criminal law’s “vices.”233
Importantly, these vices have led to an even more profound conse-
quence: the criminal justice system has become more uncoordinated and
illogical, more unjustifiable.  When society is faced with the inconsistent
enforcement and arbitrary adjudication of its criminal laws, it affects how the
public views the criminal justice system as a whole—it erodes the criminal
law’s legitimacy.  This is one of the reasons overly expansive criminal law, and
the power it gives prosecutors and agents, is so problematic.  The vices of the
criminal law “degrade the quality of criminal codes . . . jeopardizing the qual-
ity of justice the system generates.”234  White collar and corporate criminal
law is no exception.235  The public sees a “legal order that is deeply compro-
mised” in this area.236
It is this degradation, this erosion of legitimacy, that criminalized com-
pliance is importing into the corporation.  Because criminalized compliance
mimics the criminal law, and has adopted many of its precepts—including
deterrence-focused rules, aggressive and onerous monitoring, and inconsis-
tent enforcement and adjudication—it suffers from the same lack of legiti-
macy in the eyes of corporate employees as white collar and corporate
criminal law does in the eyes of the public.237  As Scott Killingsworth
explains, “ ‘command-and-control’ oriented [compliance] programs . . . [pro-
231 See id. at 758; see also supra Section II.A (discussing the motivations of prosecutors
and regulatory agents when intervening in corporate affairs).
232 See Beale, supra note 145, at 758–59.
233 Id. at 749.
234 Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
537, 589–90 (2012).
235 See Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, Public Perceptions of White Collar Crime Cul-
pability: Bribery, Perjury, and Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 34 (2012) (finding a
disconnect between the public’s perception of white collar criminal law and its reality);
Haugh, supra note 45, at 190–91 (citing Andrea Schoepfer et al., Do Perceptions of Punish-
ment Vary Between White-Collar and Street Crimes?, 35 J. CRIM. JUST. 151, 160 (2007) (present-
ing findings suggesting educated and wealthier individuals have more experience with
white collar crime and perceive it as going “largely undetected”)).
236 Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal
Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1662 (2012); see also Podgor, supra note 27, at 529–30.
237 Although more direct empirical data regarding the public’s views are needed, opin-
ion polls demonstrate that most people feel white collar crime enforcement is varied and
inadequate. See Donald J. Rebovich & John L. Kane, An Eye for an Eye in the Electronic Age:
Gauging Public Attitude Toward White Collar Crime and Punishment, 1 J. ECON. CRIME MGMT.,
no. 2, 2002, at 12.  And recent studies suggest that those segments of the public most likely
to encounter white collar crime deem its detection and punishment as uncertain. See
Schoepfer et al., supra note 235, at 160 (“More educated and wealthier individuals were
less likely to view white-collar crimes as being more certain of detection and less likely to be
punished than street crimes, especially with regard to how they perceived the criminal
justice system currently operated.”).
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vide] [t]he explicit message [that] is the same as the message from law
enforcement: follow the rules or pay the penalty.”238  The resulting employee
reactions “range from resentment, to an ‘us-versus-them’ attitude towards
management,”239 both of which cause the “legitimacy of the program [to be]
slowly chipped away.”240  Scholars have documented this erosion of legiti-
macy in corporate compliance regimes that share the features of the criminal
law.241
This is the story of Intel, whose employees, despite being subject to a
compliance program that was “the world’s best,” saw it first as oppressive and
then as a lesson in how to hide their wrongdoing.242  It is also the story of
Morgan Stanley.243  While the company’s rare declination ensures its compli-
ance program will be lauded for its effectiveness, in reality its own employees
believed the program lacked legitimacy.  In an interview after his sentencing,
Garth Peterson explained that despite the public perception that Morgan
Stanley “had this wonderful compliance program,” it was overly aggressive at
times and pro forma at others.244  Former colleagues of Peterson agreed.245
In other words, the program suffered from the same “vices” that the criminal
law does—it was a command-and-control regime inconsistently, and possibly
arbitrarily, enforced.  These vices lessened the program’s overall legitimacy
from the perspective of company employees.
Interestingly, Peterson concluded his interview by commenting that the
problem with Morgan Stanley’s compliance program was that it failed to
238 Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance Through Organi-
zational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 966 (2012).
239 Id. at 968.
240 David Hess, Ethical Infrastructures and Evidence-Based Corporate Compliance and Ethics
Programs: Policy Implications from the Empirical Evidence, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 317, 364 (2016).
241 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 35, at 97–98 (discussing the work of social psycholo-
gist, Robert Cialdini, who predicts reduced employee morale and lower rates of compli-
ance when companies “turn[ ] up the heat” on monitoring); see also Killingsworth, supra
note 238, at 968 (discussing research that suggests command-and-control tactics such as
aggressive monitoring cause employees to “‘live down’ to the low expectations that are
projected upon them”); Lambsdorff, supra note 213, at 3–5 (discussing research finding
that aggressive monitoring and signaled distrust in the workplace undermine workplace
morale and create suspicion between employees and management); Maurice E. Stucke, In
Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 J. CORP. L. 769, 818–19 (2014) (same);
Paine, supra note 16, at 111 (explaining that “[e]mployees may rebel against programs that
stress penalties” and view compliance programs that do not address root causes of miscon-
duct skeptically).
242 Yoffie & Kwak, supra note 1, at 122 (noting that employees under the program were R
described as “often shaken”); Complaint, supra note 13, at 19 (alleging that “the actual
effect of the program was to school Intel executives in cover-up”).
243 And, it will likely be the story of JPMorgan. See supra text accompanying notes
227–28, 242.
244 Cohn, supra note 217.
245 Id. (reporting that Peterson’s colleague acknowledged that “little attention was paid
to the U.S. anti-bribery laws during the Chinese real estate boom” and that “most employ-
ees ‘knew very little’ about the FCPA” at the time).
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“get[ ] into people’s heads, which is what really matters.”246  This senti-
ment—that to be successful, compliance must take into account how employ-
ees think—provides a fitting transition to the behavioral implications of
criminalized compliance.
III. THE BEHAVIORAL IMPACTS OF CRIMINALIZED COMPLIANCE
Much has been written regarding the adverse impacts that a lack of legit-
imacy has on compliance effectiveness.247  But while most scholarly work
focuses on the general connection between illegitimacy and ineffectiveness,
this Article contributes a more direct argument as to the underlying reason
for why that occurs.  Delegitimized compliance regimes can never be fully
effective because they fuel employee rationalizations that allow unethical and
illegal behavior to go forward.  This is the inherent flaw of criminalized
compliance—it facilitates the behaviors that compliance is intended to
prevent.
A. How Rationalizations Operate in White Collar and Corporate Offenders
To demonstrate this point, it is necessary to understand how rationaliza-
tions operate to allow wrongdoing by white collar and corporate offend-
ers.248  Rationalization theory begins with the work of criminologist Donald
Cressey.  Cressey used a study of embezzlers to develop a social psychological
theory regarding the causes of “respectable” crime.249  Building on Edwin
Sutherland’s theory of differential association, which posited that criminal
behavior involves “motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes favorable to
246 Id.
247 The groundbreaking work of Tom Tyler and others has demonstrated this repeat-
edly. See Tom R. Tyler et al., The Ethical Commitment to Compliance: Building Value-Based
Cultures, 50 CAL. MGMT. REV. 31, 35 (2008); Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Can Business
Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct? The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings, 48
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1143, 1153 (2005); Gary R. Weaver & Linda Klebe Trevin˜o, Compliance and
Values Oriented Ethics Programs: Influences on Employees’ Attitudes and Behavior, 9 BUS. ETHICS
Q. 315, 333 (1999); Paine, supra note 16, at 111; see also Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson,
Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and
Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 212 (2012).
248 This Article uses the terms rationalization and neutralization more or less inter-
changeably, albeit using the former much more than the latter.  This is consistent with
criminological and behavioral ethics literature. See, e.g., Anand et al., supra note 17, at 40;
Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 234–39. But see Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza,
Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 664, 666–67 (1957)
(using the term “rationalization” to mean post-act justification or excuse, and “neutraliza-
tion” to mean pre-act vocabulary of motive).
249 DONALD R. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
EMBEZZLEMENT 19 (1973); Donald R. Cressey, The Respectable Criminal, 3 CRIMINOLOGICA 13,
14–15 (1965).
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the violation of law,”250 Cressey determined that three key elements are nec-
essary for violations of a financial trust—the essence of all white collar and
corporate crime—to occur.251
First, Cressey theorized that an individual must possess a nonshareable
financial problem; that is, a financial problem the individual feels cannot be
solved by revealing it to others.252  Second, the individual must believe that
the financial problem can be solved in secret by violating a trust.253  Third,
the individual must verbalize the relationship between the nonshareable
financial problem and the illegal or unethical solution in “language that lets
him look on trust violation as something other than trust violation.”254  Put
another way, the individual uses words and phrases during an internal dia-
logue that makes the behavior acceptable in his mind, thus keeping his per-
ception of himself as an honest citizen intact.255
Cressey called verbalizations “the crux of the problem.”256  He believed
that the words a potential offender uses during his conversations with himself
were “actually the most important elements in the process which gets him
into trouble, or keeps him out of trouble.”257  Cressey did not view these
verbalizations as after-the-fact excuses that offenders used to relieve their cul-
pability upon being caught.  Instead, he found that verbalizations were vocab-
ularies of motive, words and phrases not invented by the offender “on the
spur of the moment,” but that existed as group definitions labeling deviant
behavior as appropriate.258  Importantly, this meant that an offender’s ratio-
nalizations were created before wrongdoing occurred.  As Cressey put it,
“[t]he rationalization is his motivation”—it not only justifies his behavior to
others, but it makes the behavior intelligible, and therefore actionable, to
250 See Sykes & Matza, supra note 248, at 664; see also EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE
COLLAR CRIME 240 (1983).  Sutherland’s groundbreaking work “invented the concept” of
white collar crime.
251 See Cressey, supra note 249, at 14.
252 Id.  Cressey explained that the problem may not seem dire from the outsider’s per-
spective, but “what matters is the psychological perspective of the potential [white collar
criminal].” Id.  Thus, problems may vary in type and severity, from gambling debts to
business losses, which the individual is ashamed to reveal.  Cressey’s definition of a non-
shareable problem also encompasses standard notions of greed. See JAMES WILLIAM COLE-
MAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE 195 (5th ed. 2002).
253 Cressey, supra note 249, at 14–15.
254 Id. at 14–15.
255 See id.  The prototypical verbalization is an embezzler telling herself she is “borrow-
ing” the money and will pay it back.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id.
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himself.259  Thus, verbalizations permit behavior to proceed that would oth-
erwise be psychologically unavailable or unacceptable to an offender.260
Shortly after Cressey published his theories, two other criminologists,
Gresham Sykes and David Matza, advanced a sophisticated theory of how
juvenile delinquents rationalize their behavior.  Like Cressey, Sykes and
Matza found that while rationalizations might occur following deviant behav-
ior, they also preceded behavior and made it possible.261  By rationalizing
their conduct ex ante, offenders were able to limit the “[d]isapproval flowing
from internalized norms and conforming others in the social environ-
ment.”262  Sykes and Matza called these rationalizations “techniques of neu-
tralization,” and the two believed they explained the episodic nature of
delinquent behavior more completely than competing theories.263  Neutrali-
zation techniques—what are commonly called rationalizations—explained
how offenders could “remain[ ] committed to [society’s] dominant norma-
tive system,” yet qualify that system’s imperatives in a way to make periodic
violations “‘acceptable’ if not ‘right.’”264  Rationalization theory and its core
idea—that the psychological mechanisms offenders use to rationalize their
behavior are a critical component in the commission of crime—have greatly
influenced the study of both white collar crime and business ethics.265
Although rationalization theory has applicability to all criminal behavior,
it has particular force in explaining white collar and corporate crime.  As an
initial matter, rationalization theory has its roots in Cressey’s study of
“respectable” crime.266  Indeed, Sykes and Matza recognized that rationaliza-
tions are used not only by juveniles, but might also be used by adults engaged
in general forms of deviance, including those committing crimes in the
workplace.267
259 CRESSEY, supra note 249, at 94–95. Cressey explained that his interviews of embez-
zlers revealed “significant rationalizations were always present before the criminal act took
place, or at least at the time it took place, and, in fact, after the act had taken place the
rationalization often was abandoned.” Id. at 94.
260 See id. at 153.  Cressey conducted interviews with inmates at three penitentiaries who
were incarcerated for crimes defined as “the criminal violation of financial trust.” Id. at 22.
Although criminological studies such as Cressey’s often rely on such qualitative interviews,
concerns regarding sample selection and generalizability cannot be ignored. See Maruna
& Copes, supra note 17, at 260–70 (discussing the pros and cons of interview-based, survey-
based, and quantitative rationalization research).
261 Sykes & Matza, supra note 248, at 666.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 667.
264 Id.
265 See Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 222 (stating that the “influence of this crea-
tive insight has been unquestionable”); see also Anand et al., supra note 17, at 39 (applying
rationalization theory to business law and ethics in a widely cited work); Heath, supra note
17, at 610–11 (same).
266 Cressey, supra note 249, at 13, 16.
267 Sykes & Matza, supra note 248, at 666; see also William A. Stadler & Michael L. Ben-
son, Revisiting the Guilty Mind: The Neutralization of White-Collar Crime, 37 CRIM. JUST. REV.
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More fundamentally, rationalization theory is especially applicable in
describing the causes of corporate crime because “almost by definition white-
collar offenders are more strongly committed to the central normative struc-
ture.”268  They are older, more educated, better employed, and have more
assets than other offenders.269  These factors suggest that white collar offend-
ers are able to conform to normative roles and have a self-interest in doing
so—they have a “greater ‘stake’ in conformity” than other categories of
offenders.270  Therefore, white collar offenders must rationalize their behav-
ior through “elaborate . . . processes prior to their offenses.”271  Without
employing rationalizations, they would be unable to “bring [their] actions
into correspondence with the class of actions that is implicitly acceptable
in . . . society.”272  Not surprisingly, numerous studies have documented the
use of rationalizations by white collar and corporate offenders.273
B. Common White Collar and Corporate Offender Rationalizations
To put rationalization theory in better context, below are eight of the
most prominent rationalizations used by white collar and corporate offend-
ers.274  These are also the key rationalizations that employees of Intel, Mor-
gan Stanley, JP Morgan, and other companies with criminalized compliance
regimes rely on when committing illegal or unethical acts.275
Denial of Responsibility.  Called the “master account,” the denial-of-respon-
sibility rationalization occurs when the offender defines her conduct in a way
that relieves her of responsibility, thereby mitigating “both social disapproval
494, 495–96 (2012) (explaining the applicability of Sykes’s and Matza’s theories to white
collar offending).
268 Michael L. Benson, Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for Involvement in a White-
Collar Crime, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 583, 587 (1985).  Of course, defining what exactly is society’s
central normative structure is difficult.  As used here, it means only a law-abiding structure;
however, it is easily extended to norm-abiding behavior within corporations.
269 See MICHAEL L. BENSON & SALLY S. SIMPSON, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: AN OPPORTUNITY
PERSPECTIVE 51–52 (2009).
270 Scott M. Kieffer & John J. Sloan III, Overcoming Moral Hurdles: Using Techniques of
Neutralization by White-Collar Suspects as an Interrogation Tool, 22 SECURITY J. 317, 324 (2009).
271 Benson, supra note 268, at 587.
272 Id. at 588.
273 See, e.g., id. at 591–98 (finding antitrust, tax, financial trust, fraud, and false state-
ments offenders were “nearly unanimous” in rationalizing their criminal conduct by “deny-
ing basic criminality”); Petter Gottschalk, Rotten Apples Versus Rotten Barrels in White Collar
Crime: A Qualitative Analysis of White Collar Offenders in Norway, 7 INT’L J. CRIM. JUST. SCI. 575,
580–81 (2012) (applying rationalization theory in a study of Norwegian white collar
offenders); Stadler & Benson, supra note 267, at 496 (listing the domains in which
researchers have explored the use of rationalizations, including occupational deviance,
corporate crime, and other forms of white collar offending).
274 Sykes and Matza originally identified five rationalization techniques. See Sykes &
Matza, supra note 248, at 667–70.  Currently, researchers have identified between fifteen
and twenty. See Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 234; Stadler & Benson, supra note 267,
at 496–97.
275 See supra Section II.C.
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and a personal sense of failure.”276  Generally, offenders deny responsibility
by claiming their behavior is accidental or due to forces outside their con-
trol.277  White collar offenders deny responsibility by pleading ignorance,
suggesting they were acting under orders, or contending larger economic
conditions caused them to act illegally.278  The complexity of laws regulating
white collar crimes and the hierarchical structure of companies offer offend-
ers numerous ways to deny their responsibility.279
Denial of Injury.  This rationalization focuses on the injury or harm
caused by the illegal or unethical act.280  White collar offenders may rational-
ize their behavior by asserting that no one will really be harmed.281  If an
act’s wrongfulness is partly a function of the harm it causes, an offender can
excuse or mollify her behavior if no clear harm exists.282  The classic use of
this technique in white collar crime is an embezzler describing her actions as
“borrowing” the money—by the offender’s estimation, no one will be hurt
because the money will be paid back.283  Offenders may also employ this
rationalization when the victim is insured or the harm is to the public or
market as a whole, such as in insider trading or antitrust cases.284
Denial of the Victim.  Even if a white collar offender accepts responsibility
for her conduct and acknowledges that it is harmful, she may insist that the
injury was not wrong by denying the victim in order to neutralize the “moral
indignation of self and others.”285  Denying the victim takes two forms.  One
is when the offender argues that the victim’s actions were inappropriate and
therefore he deserved the harm.286  The second is when the victim is “absent,
unknown, or abstract,” which is often the case with property and economic
276 Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 231–32.
277 Sykes & Matza, supra note 249, at 667 (“By learning to view himself as more acted
upon than acting, the delinquent prepares the way for deviance from the dominant nor-
mative system without the necessity of a frontal assault on the norms themselves.”).
278 See Kieffer & Sloan, supra note 270, at 320–21 (explaining how white collar offend-
ers blame violations on “personal problems, such as alcoholism, drug addiction, or per-
ceived dire financial difficulties”).
279 See Benson, supra note 268, at 594 (reporting that an income tax offender referred
to criminal behavior as “mistakes” resulting from ignorance or poor bookkeeping);
Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 232 (describing how an engineer at B.F. Goodrich
failed to inform his supervisor of the reporting of false documents because he “learned a
long time ago not to worry about things over which [he] ha[d] no control”).
280 Sykes & Matza, supra note 248, at 667.
281 Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 232.
282 Id.
283 See Cressey, supra note 249, at 15; Kieffer & Sloan, supra note 270, at 321–22.
284 See COLEMAN, supra note 252, at 196 (providing an example of a price fixing
offender asserting that while his conduct may have been “illegal,” it was “not criminal”
because “criminal action meant damaging someone, and we did not do that”).
285 Sykes & Matza, supra note 248, at 668.
286 See Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 232; see also Kieffer & Sloan, supra note 270,
at 322 (describing physicians committing Medicare fraud as claiming the excess reimburse-
ments they submitted were “only what they rightfully deserved for their work”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 43 22-MAR-17 13:02
2017] the  criminalization  of  compliance 1257
crimes.287  In this instance, the offender may be able to minimize her inter-
nal culpability because there are no visible victims “stimulat[ing] the
offender’s conscience.”288  White collar offenders may use this rationaliza-
tion in frauds against the government, such as false claims or tax evasion
cases, and other crimes in which the true victim is abstract.289
Condemning the Condemners.  White collar offenders may also rationalize
their behavior by shifting attention away from their conduct and onto the
motives of other persons or groups, such as regulators, prosecutors, and gov-
ernment agencies.290  By doing so, the offender “has changed the subject of
the conversation”; by attacking others, “the wrongfulness of [her] own behav-
ior is more easily repressed.”291  This rationalization takes many forms in
white collar cases: the offender calls her critics hypocrites, argues they are
compelled by personal spite, or asserts they are motivated by political gain.292
The claim of selective enforcement or prosecution is particularly prominent
in this rationalization.293  In addition, white collar offenders may point to a
biased regulatory system or an anticapitalist government to rationalize their
acts.294
Appeal to Higher Loyalties.  The appeal-to-higher-loyalties rationalization
occurs when an individual sacrifices the normative demands of society for
that of a smaller group to which the offender belongs.295  The offender does
not necessarily reject the norms she is violating; rather, she sees other norms
that are aligned with her group as more compelling.296  In the white collar
context, the group could be familial, professional, or organizational.  Offend-
ers rationalizing their behavior as necessary to provide for their families, pro-
tect a boss or employee, shore up a failing business, or maximize shareholder
value are employing this technique.297
Metaphor of the Ledger.  White collar offenders may accept responsibility
for their conduct and acknowledge the harm it caused, yet still rationalize
their behavior by comparing it to their previous good behaviors.298  By creat-
287 Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 233; Sykes & Matza, supra note 248, at 668.
288 Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 233.
289 See Kieffer & Sloan, supra note 270, at 322.
290 Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 233; Sykes & Matza, supra note 248, at 668.
291 Sykes & Matza, supra note 248, at 668.
292 See Kieffer & Sloan, supra note 270, at 323.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Sykes & Matza, supra note 248, at 669.
296 Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 233.
297 See Kieffer & Sloan, supra note 270, at 323 (describing an antitrust offender who
justified his conduct by saying, “I thought . . . we were more or less working on a survival
basis in order to try to make enough to keep our plant and our employees” (quoting JOHN
E. CONKLIN, CRIMINOLOGY 176 (8th ed. 2004))).
298 See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR & CORPORATE CRIME 913 (Lawrence M. Salin-
ger ed., 2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA]; Paul Michael Klenowski, “Other Peo-
ple’s Money”: An Empirical Examination of the Motivational Differences Between Male
and Female White Collar Offenders 53–54 (May 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Indiana University of Pennsylvania) (on file with author).
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ing a “behavior balance sheet,” the offender sees her current negative actions
as outweighed by a lifetime of good deeds, both personal and professional,
which minimizes moral guilt.299
Claim of Entitlement.  Under the claim-of-entitlement rationalization,
offenders justify their conduct on the grounds that they deserve the fruits of
their illegal behavior.300  This rationalization is particularly common in
employee theft and embezzlement cases, but is also seen in public corruption
cases.301
Claim of Relative Acceptability/Normality.  The final white collar rationaliza-
tion entails an offender justifying her conduct by comparing it to the con-
duct of others.  If “others are worse” or “everybody else is doing it,” the
offender, although acknowledging her conduct, is able to minimize the
attached moral stigma and view her behavior as aligned with acceptable
norms.302  In white collar cases, this rationalization is often used by tax viola-
tors and in real estate, accounting, and insider trading frauds.303  It is partic-
ularly prevalent when the organizational culture is strong and insulated.304
The above discussion highlights a few additional points about rationali-
zation theory.  First, rationalizations are not “one size fits all.”  Offenders
employ them in different degrees, combine them with other rationalizations,
and use them at different times.  Moreover, the exact verbalizations an
offender uses to rationalize her behavior will be specific to her circumstances
because they are part of her internal dialogue influenced by her unique envi-
ronment.305  The above list suggests that some rationalizations will overlap
and that offenders may use multiple rationalizations to fully minimize their
behavior.
Second, it is often questioned how researchers can be sure that an
offender’s rationalizations are occurring prior to the unethical or criminal
act, thereby allowing the behavior to proceed, versus occurring after the act,
rendering the rationalizations mere excuses.306  Longitudinal studies demon-
strate the presence of ex ante rationalizations, yet the “sequencing question”
persists in the criminological literature.307  As to white collar and corporate
299 See ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 298, at 913.
300 COLEMAN, supra note 252, at 198.
301 Id. (describing a former city councilman who explained his involvement in corrup-
tion as due to his low salary and lack of staff); Klenowski, supra note 298, at 209–10.
302 COLEMAN, supra note 252, at 197; Klenowski, supra note 298, at 67, 209–10.
303 See COLEMAN, supra note 252, at 197 (describing a real estate agent rationalizing
fraud as rampant); Benson, supra note 268, at 594 (describing tax offenders claiming that
“everybody cheats somehow on their taxes”).
304 See Heath, supra note 17, at 603, 608–09 (describing business pressures that may
foster the “everyone else is doing it” rationalization).
305 MARK M. LANIER & STUART HENRY, ESSENTIAL CRIMINOLOGY 168–69 (2d ed. 2004).
306 See Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 271 (calling this the “lingering ‘chicken-or-
the-egg’ debate”).
307 See, e.g., Robert Agnew, The Techniques of Neutralization and Violence, 32 CRIMINOLOGY
555, 564–73 (1994) (presenting a longitudinal study supporting rationalization theory’s ex
ante sequencing).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 45 22-MAR-17 13:02
2017] the  criminalization  of  compliance 1259
crime, however, the question need not be answered definitively.  Criminolo-
gists Shadd Maruna and Heith Copes have explained that even if white collar
offenders commit criminal acts “in the absence of definitions favorable to
them”; that is, without using verbalizations that minimize moral guilt, those
definitions “get applied retroactively to excuse or redefine the initial deviant
acts.  To the extent that they successfully mitigate . . . self-punishment, they
become discriminative for repetition of the deviant acts and, hence, precede
the future commission of the acts.”308  In other words, a rationalization may
start off as an after-the-fact excuse, but necessarily becomes the rationale that
facilitates future offending.  And because almost no white collar offenses are
truly singular acts, but instead are made up of a number of smaller acts
occurring over time, there is little concern that an offender may be employ-
ing an after-the-fact excuse that did not somehow rationalize her course of
criminal conduct.  Rationalizations, then, regardless of when they are
expressed, reflect a white collar or corporate offender’s pre- and inter-act
thinking.309
C. How Criminalized Compliance Fuels Rationalizations, Thereby
Undermining Corporate Compliance
With that understanding, the fundamental flaw of criminalized compli-
ance becomes clear.  Criminalized compliance, by delegitimizing the compli-
ance function in the eyes of corporate employees, creates opportunities for
the adoption of powerful rationalizations.  These rationalizations not only
limit the effectiveness of compliance, they actively facilitate the behavior
compliance is intended to eliminate.
How this occurs is a product of both how rationalizations operate and
from where they originate.  In his study, Cressey found that the rationaliza-
tions embezzlers used to minimize the disconnect between their behavior
and their self-perception were not “invented . . . on the spur of the moment”
by them “or anyone else.”310  Instead, Cressey found that before a vocabulary
of motive could be taken over and used by a would-be embezzler, it must
“exist as [a] group definition[ ] in which the behavior in question, even
crime, is in a sense appropriate.”311  He concluded that rationalizations are, in
effect, swirling around in society, waiting to be assimilated and internalized
308 Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 271 (quoting RONALD L. AKERS, DEVIANT BEHAV-
IOR: A SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH 60 (3d ed. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
309 That said, human thinking is undoubtedly complex; determining the exact moment
that a thought enters a person’s mind and if it changes over time is difficult, if not impossi-
ble.  Because of this, the question of sequencing will likely persist for some time. Compare
Agnew, supra note 307, at 555, with Paul Cromwell & Quint Thurman, The Devil Made Me
Do It: Use of Neutralizations by Shoplifters, 24 DEVIANT BEHAV. 535, 547 (2003) (arguing that
“[n]o one . . . has yet been able to empirically verify the existence of preevent [as opposed
to post-event] neutralizations”).
310 Cressey, supra note 249, at 15.
311 Id.
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by individuals contemplating solving their nonshareable problems by violat-
ing a trust.312
Cressey further explained that rationalizations originate from “popular
ideologies that sanction crime in our culture.”313  He pointed to common-
place sayings that suggest wrongdoing is acceptable in certain situations, such
as “[a]ll people steal when they get in a tight spot” and “[h]onesty is the best
policy, but business is business.”314  Once verbalizations such as these have
been adopted by individuals, they transform into powerful, context-specific
rationalizations: “I’m only going to use the money temporarily, so I am bor-
rowing, not stealing” (denial of injury); and “I have tried to live an honest life
but I’ve had nothing but troubles, so to hell with it” (claim of
entitlement).315
Building on this idea, Sykes and Matza found that rationalizations origi-
nate from an even more specific location: the criminal law itself.  According
to them, great flexibility exists in criminal law; despite how the public gener-
ally sees it, criminal law is variable—“it does not consist of a body of rules
held to be binding under all conditions.”316  Citing defenses to criminal lia-
bility such as necessity, insanity, compulsion, and self-defense, Sykes and
Matza viewed application of the criminal code as an exercise in avoidance.317
They argued that if an individual “can prove that criminal intent was lack-
ing,” he can “avoid moral culpability for his criminal action—and thus avoid
the negative sanctions of society.”318  In other words, if a would-be offender
can latch on to a rationalizing “defense” to his behavior, he can “engage in
delinquency without serious damage to his self image.”319  This led Sykes and
Matza to one of their most important findings: that much anti-normative
behavior is based on “what is essentially an unrecognized extension of [legal]
defenses to crimes, in the form of justifications for deviance that are seen as
valid by the delinquent but not by the legal system or society at large.”320
Wrongdoers find space within the criminal law that allows for their
rationalizations.321
If rationalizations are drawn from an offender’s environment, which
includes from the criminal law itself, then criminalized compliance regimes
that import the delegitimizing features of the criminal law into corporations
play a significant role in fostering unethical and criminal behavior within
those corporations.  Criminal law-driven compliance programs that employ
command-and-control, deterrence-based strategies lack legitimacy in the view
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Sykes & Matza, supra note 248, at 666 (citing ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN
SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 28 (1951)).
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Id. at 666–67.
320 Id. at 666 (emphasis omitted).
321 Id.; see also DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 61 (1990).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 47 22-MAR-17 13:02
2017] the  criminalization  of  compliance 1261
of many corporate employees.322  This perceived illegitimacy is critical
because it provides space for employees to formulate the rationalizations nec-
essary for their bad conduct.  In this space, employees find “defenses” to the
internal corporate norms and external legal rules that are fundamental to
the compliance function.  Employees then internalize and incorporate these
defenses into their own thought processes.  Once this occurs, there is little
stopping an employee’s future unethical or even criminal conduct from
going forward, regardless of the compliance regime in place.  There is simply
no normative “check” available to the employee because it has been rational-
ized away.323
A return to two familiar examples illustrates how this operates in prac-
tice.  The NYAG’s complaint against Intel quoted executives regarding their
views on the company’s anticompetitive business tactics.  Many of these state-
ments evidence a rationalizing construct.  For example, Paul Otellini, Intel’s
CEO, chastised executives from Hewlett Packard (HP) and IBM for using
AMD technology, which was directly competing with Intel’s, in their prod-
ucts, reminding them of their reliance on Intel and the companies’ long-
term partnerships.324  This reveals the claim-of-entitlement rationalization,
whereby Ottelini believed he had a “right” to pressure Intel’s partners to act
against AMD because Intel’s technology had helped those partners build
market share.325  Similarly, statements by Intel executives indicate they
believed market pressures and the competitive environment of the tech busi-
ness justified their anticompetitive tactics.  Top Intel executives told their
counterparts at HP that “Intel doesn’t initiate aggressive price actions but
merely respond[s].”326  This statement illustrates two classic rationalizations:
one is denial of responsibility, in which factors outside the executives’ control
are seen as relieving them of responsibility for their acts;327 the other is
denial of the victim, in which the executives deem themselves to be rightfully
retaliating against the actions of competitors who no longer deserve ethical
treatment.328  Finally, Intel executives rationalized their specific anticompeti-
tive acts by deferring to what was “necessary” to keep a competitive edge with
their main equipment buyers.  In one email, an Intel executive justified a
payment to Dell for excluding AMD by stating, “This is really easy . . . MSD
322 See supra Section II.D.
323 For an example of how this occurs in the context of would-be tax offenders, see
Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191, 1226–29
(2015).
324 Complaint, supra note 13, at 9–10 (relaying Otellini email as saying, “If we are your
key partner, this is nothing but a slap at us . . . I really don’t want to get in a pissing contest
over this . . . . But running an ad touting 10 years with [AMD] and ‘choice’ is not the
behavior of someone who wants to bring our two companies together.” (first alteration in
original)).
325 See COLEMAN, supra note 252, at 198.
326 Complaint, supra note 13, at 24 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
327 Sykes & Matza, supra note 248, at 667.
328 Id. at 668.
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[Michael Dell] wants $400M [million] more.”329  By viewing the payment as
required because a major buyer wanted it, the executive denied his own
responsibility for the anticompetitive behavior.330
Critically, these and other rationalizations were fostered by Intel’s
criminalized compliance regime.  In addition to the mock raids and staged
cross-examinations—now accepted tactics of criminal law-driven compliance
programs331—executives received seemingly instantaneous admonitions
when they communicated in ways that raised potential antitrust concerns.332
Very quickly executives were trained to limit mention of topics that would
“make [them] squirm” or “come back to haunt [them].”333  The company’s
“active approach” to compliance left employees with the impression that
anticompetitive behavior was part of doing business—that it was not a sub-
stantive wrong, but merely a legal concern that could be managed by inten-
sive training.  Whether he intended it or not, Intel’s General Counsel, Tom
Dunlap, communicated to employees that the goal of antitrust compliance
was to limit mention of antitrust behavior, rather than to eliminate the behav-
ior itself.334
This is problematic because if compliance is seen as only a legal require-
ment, and one that can be obviated by shrewd communication strategies,
then employees may view the underlying conduct as harmless.  This facilitates
the denial-of-injury and the denial-of-the-victim rationalizations.  In addition,
if anticompetitive tactics are seen as part of doing business, employees may
more easily deny their responsibility when using such tactics.  Moreover,
Intel’s approach more generally delegitimized compliance, and possibly the
company as a whole, in the eyes of its employees, which creates space for all
rationalizations to take hold.  When the “world’s best antitrust compliance
program” is seen by employees as nothing more than a hedge against govern-
ment intervention, and possibly as a means of shielding the company from
liability at the expense of employee well-being, it calls into question the legiti-
macy of the full scope of Intel’s rules and norms.335
329 Complaint, supra note 13, at 17 (second and third alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
330 Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 232.
331 See Press Release, supra note 222.
332 See Complaint, supra note 13, at 19 (describing an email warning an executive
against drafting documents asking customers for specific market share targets and sug-
gesting alternate wording that would “implicitly build that idea in”).
333 Yoffie & Kwak, supra note 1, at 122.
334 A more extreme version of this may have occurred at General Motors, exacerbating
the company’s ignition switch crisis. See Marianne Jennings & Lawrence J. Trautman, Ethi-
cal Culture and Legal Liability: The GM Switch Crisis and Lessons in Governance, 22 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 188, 220–21 (2016) (discussing policy of not taking notes and avoiding phrases in
reports to limit legal liability).
335 Yoffie & Kwak, supra note 1, at 120 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Lambsdorff, supra note 213, at 10 (discussing the lack of trust that develops when compli-
ance is seen as a means of “collecting . . . pieces of evidence, [so that] companies can shift
the responsibility of a criminal act to their employees”).
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The Morgan Stanley case offers an even more direct example.  In his
interview, Garth Peterson explained why he secretly invested in the suspect
real estate deal and funneled an investment to his Chinese government con-
tact.  Peterson insisted that he was recouping the investment he and the offi-
cial had made in the real estate development, which predated his
employment at Morgan Stanley.336  He claimed that he was angry when the
bank required him to divest his interest in the deal, so he “found a way to buy
back in at the same price that [he]’d been forced out at.”337  As misguided as
Peterson’s thinking is, it demonstrates an obvious rationalization.  He denied
Morgan Stanley as the victim by viewing the bank’s actions as inappropriate,
which in his mind made it deserving of the harm caused by his wrongdo-
ing.338  In addition, Peterson employed the condemning-the-condemners
rationalization when he criticized both Morgan Stanley’s and the govern-
ment’s enforcement of the FCPA.339  By shifting attention away from his con-
duct and onto the motives of others, Peterson was able to “more easily
repress[ ]” the wrongfulness of his actions.340  Finally, Peterson appears to
have rationalized his conduct through claims of entitlement and relative
acceptability.  In recalling his time in the “wild and wooly Asian property bus-
iness” of the early 2000s, Peterson explained how he grew Morgan Stanley’s
portfolio “exponentially.”341  He also explained that the “go-go atmosphere”
during the Chinese real estate boom and the expectations of a relationship-
driven culture “left compliance on the sidelines.”342  How Peterson verbal-
ized the reasons for his behavior demonstrates that he believed he deserved
at least some of the fruits of his unethical behavior,343 and that everyone else
was acting similarly at the time.344  Both rationalizations allow for the mini-
mization of moral guilt, thereby keeping Peterson’s perception of himself as
an honest citizen intact despite his illegal acts.345
Peterson’s statements also indicate that Morgan Stanley’s criminalized
compliance approach fostered some of his rationalizations.  For one, Peter-
son’s anger stemmed from the bank’s disallowance of his continued partici-
pation in the real estate deal.  While that may have been proper from a
corporate risk management standpoint, Peterson suggested it was more
aggressive than the industry norm at the time.346  Further, it conflicted with
336 Cohn, supra note 217.
337 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
338 Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 232.
339 Cohn, supra note 217 (describing how Peterson stated that what he “fe[lt] bad
about is the government lying to the public and saying that they (Morgan Stanley) had this
wonderful compliance program, when in fact the government knows that it wasn’t getting
into people’s heads” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
340 Sykes & Matza, supra note 248, at 668.
341 Cohn, supra note 217 (internal quotation marks omitted).
342 Id.
343 See COLEMAN, supra note 252, at 198.
344 See Klenowski, supra note 298, at 67, 209–10.
345 Cressey, supra note 249, at 15.
346 Cohn, supra note 217.
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how the bank approached compliance in other areas.  Both Peterson and
another executive explained that there was “very little” FCPA compliance
prior to 2008.347  From the employees’ standpoint, Morgan Stanley’s compli-
ance program was inconsistent and arbitrary—lax in some areas, strict in
others.  This led to Peterson’s overall perception that the program lacked
coherence, which created space for the adoption of his rationalizations.348
Further, like with Intel, the aggressive nature of Morgan Stanley’s moni-
toring efforts seemed to motivate some of Peterson’s rationalizations.  After
being frozen out of the real estate deal, Peterson knew that the bank would
conduct additional background checks, make pretextual calls, and investi-
gate the various companies receiving payouts.  Accordingly, Peterson used his
compliance “training” to be a better wrongdoer, funneling his secret invest-
ment through only pre-approved channels.349  As he saw it, this was not
much different than deleting emailed compliance reminders or muting com-
pliance training videos while doing other work—the company’s FCPA com-
pliance program was a technical requirement to be navigated around.350
Again, while this thinking is clearly wrong, it demonstrates that the compli-
ance program lacked true legitimacy, which created opportunities for Peter-
son to rationalize his eventual illegal behavior.  This illegitimacy was a
product of a criminal law-driven compliance program concerned more with
aggressive enforcement than building substantive, positive employee norms.
While it is fascinating how the employees of Intel and Morgan Stanley
rationalized their conduct, it is by no means unexpected.  Rationalization
theory dictates that white collar and corporate employees must use rational-
izations in order to commit an unethical or illegal act.351  But what is unex-
pected—and what demonstrates the inherent flaw of criminalized
compliance—is that many of the rationalizations were fueled by the delegi-
timizing features of the criminal law as imported into the corporation.  This
insight provides a new way of conceptualizing compliance and of identifying
the limitations implicit in its increasingly criminalized nature.
347 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
348 While it is likely true that not every one of Peterson’s rationalizations can be directly
tied to a specific criminalized compliance measure, the delegitimization of the compliance
program as a whole in Peterson’s mind is clear. Id.  This creates an environment ripe for
the assimilation of rationalizations into the potential offender’s thought process. See CRES-
SEY, supra note 249, at 96–97 (discussing how specific rationalizations emerge from the
adoption of “rather general criminal ideologies”).
349 Information at 6, United States v. Peterson, 859 F. Supp. 2d 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(No. 12-224), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2012/04/
26/petersong-information.pdf.
350 Cohn, supra note 217 (describing common practices by employees).
351 See supra Section III.A.  Indeed, some suggest that rationalizing bad behavior is part
of the human condition.  See Maruna & Copes, supra note 17, at 285.
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CONCLUSION
This Article began with the question of how to understand the failure of
Intel’s “active approach” to compliance, a method that seemed to everyone at
the time—its creators, the company, academics surveying the program—to
be highly effective.  The simple answer, as demonstrated by this Article, is
that Intel’s approach failed because it ignored the most important aspect of
any compliance program: the impact it has on those it seeks to influence.
Intel employees saw their compliance training not as a means of generating
positive and lasting norms for the collective organizational good, but as an
aggressive tool employed to shield the company from liability while leaving
them “shaken.”352  The program ultimately “school[ed] . . . executives in
cover-up, rather than compliance” because it taught them the former was
more important than the latter.353
A more complex answer, however, is that the failure of Intel’s compli-
ance program is emblematic of a larger failing of modern corporate compli-
ance.  It is a failing driven by successive eras of compliance in which the
criminal law has become a lodestar of increasing intensity.  The result is that
many compliance regimes are becoming criminalized—they are motivated by
and mimic the criminal law, using its precepts to advance compliance goals.
The problem with this evolution is that criminalized compliance is inher-
ently unsound; it can never be fully effective in abating corporate wrongdo-
ing.  Its inherent ineffectiveness is a product of the behavioral consequences
imposed on corporate employees.  Criminalized compliance imports into the
corporation many of the criminal law’s delegitimizing features, which creates
a compliance environment that fosters employee rationalizations.  Once
rationalizations take hold, as they did with employees at Intel and Morgan
Stanley, there is little stopping the resulting illegality.  Thus, criminalized
compliance is not only inherently ineffective, it actively thwarts the efforts of
corporate compliance.
So what is to be done?  Both the evolution toward criminalized compli-
ance and its various consequences stem from expansive white collar and cor-
porate criminal law.  Deep and broad white collar criminal statutes and
regulations, coupled with respondeat superior corporate liability, consolidate
power in government agents, who use that power to enter corporations
through the compliance function.  This triggers a series of responses leading
to the delegitimization of compliance and the behavioral impacts discussed
above.  The fix, then, resides in limiting and reversing the criminal law’s
expansive depth and breadth, at least in the white collar and corporate con-
text.  Termed differently, the fix is to reverse overcriminalization.  As might
352 Yoffie & Kwok, supra note 1, at 122.
353 Complaint, supra note 13, at 19.
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be imagined, this is not an easy task,354 nor is it one corporations are well
equipped to perform.355
Instead of attacking the root of the problem, then, maybe attacking the
stalk is enough.  Corporations are equipped to alter their compliance pro-
grams to make them more legitimate in the eyes of employees, which would
lessen the opportunity for rationalized wrongdoing.  Fortunately, how com-
panies can increase internal legitimacy has been studied extensively.  Tom
Tyler, the leading scholar working in the area, has conducted decades of
research demonstrating that organizational legitimacy is created primarily by
providing employees with procedural justice.356  This includes ensuring the
fairness of decisions made by the organization, as embodied by the CEO and
the board, as well as decisions made by workgroup supervisors and cowork-
ers.357  It also includes ensuring the fairness of interpersonal treatment of
employees at both levels.358  As Tyler explains, “[t]he ideal is to have a
result . . . where procedural aspects of decision making and interpersonal
fairness dominate the organization and its workgroups.”359
Crucial to cultivating a procedurally just compliance program are the
values by which that program operates.  Tyler suggests the key values for any
company are voice, dignity, objectivity, and concern,360 but Lynn Paine’s
research argues for an “integrity-based approach” that combines concern for
354 The problems of overcriminalization were identified almost fifty years ago, and
likely before. See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 17,
18 (1968) (commenting that unless overcriminalization was addressed, “some of the most
besetting problems of criminal-law administration are bound to continue”).  The concerns
have gotten worse since. See Haugh, supra note 323, at 1197–1201 (defining overcriminal-
ization and identifying the main approaches to understanding its harms).  Those most
closely studying the phenomenon regard it as a vexing problem of the criminal justice
system, and some say it is the most pressing problem in criminal law today. See, e.g., Smith,
supra note 234, at 537–38 (citing leading scholars studying overcriminalization, including
DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2008)).
355 But see Molly Ball, Do the Koch Brothers Really Care About Criminal-Justice Reform?,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/do-the-
koch-brothers-really-care-about-criminal-justice-reform/386615/ (describing the Koch
brothers’ and Koch Industries’ role in fighting criminal justice reform).
356 See, e.g., Tyler et al., supra note 247, at 33 (demonstrating that procedural fairness is
critical in promoting employee commitment and compliance).
357 Id. at 37.
358 Id.
359 Id.  While there are many ways to achieve this ideal (and likely many more ways to
miss the mark), a procedurally just compliance program should ask whether: employees
have an opportunity to provide input before decisions are made; decisions are made fol-
lowing clear and transparent rules; decisionmaking bodies act without biases; rules are
applied consistently across “people and over time”; employees’ rights are respected;
employees’ needs are considered; supervisors follow the same rules as required for employ-
ees; and decisionmakers provide honest explanations about their conclusions. Id. at 38.
360 Id. at 40.
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the law with an emphasis on managerial responsibility for ethical behavior.361
Although she suggests that “integrity strategies” will vary among companies,
“all strive to define . . . guiding values, aspirations, and patterns of thought
and conduct.”362  The idea is that employees will adopt the values of the
company as their own, choosing compliance behavior not because it con-
forms to a rule, but because “they believe it to be the best way to act.”363
Compliance ceases to be a constraint and becomes “the governing ethos of
an organization,” fostering legitimacy organization-wide.364  Companies that
make these ideas a reality will go a long way toward compliance effectiveness.
Amplifying Tyler’s and Paine’s work and discussing its interplay with
rationalization theory in any meaningful way is unfortunately beyond the
scope of this Article, as is addressing the practical considerations of how to
implement legitimacy-focused, integrity-based compliance in companies
long-operating under criminalized compliance regimes.  But a fitting conclu-
sion requires at least some discussion of how compliance programs might be
altered so as to minimize employee rationalizations.
First off, compliance officers must understand the role of rationaliza-
tions in white collar crime and how employees will use them to assuage moral
guilt.  A review of the more accessible criminological and behavioral ethics
literature on rationalizations is a good start.365  Second, companies must take
affirmative steps to limit the adoption of rationalizations by employees.  As
Joseph Heath puts it, “The best way [for companies] to get people to behave
ethically is to put them in a situation in which ethical conduct is expected of
them and self-serving excuses are not tolerated.”366  While it is too simplistic
to characterize rationalizations as merely self-serving excuses, they do allow
bad behavior to proceed by fostering self-serving mental constructs.  Thus, in
order to combat rationalizations, companies must “create an environment in
which the standard techniques of [rationalization] used to excuse criminal
and unethical behavior are not accepted.”367
The best way to do this without reverting to command-and-control tac-
tics that destroy legitimacy is to simply let employees talk about rationaliza-
tions.  Although this approach is not easily quantifiable in terms of impact,
and thus may be difficult for compliance professionals to justify to higher-
361 Paine, supra note 16, at 106; see also Trevin˜o et al., supra note 216, at 135 (explain-
ing the first large-scale study testing and finding support for Paine’s hypothesis).  Certainly,
the works of Tyler and Paine overlap considerably.
362 Paine, supra note 16, at 107.
363 Tyler et al., supra note 247, at 32.
364 Paine, supra note 16, at 107; see also Weaver & Trevin˜o, supra note 247, at 327 (dis-
cussing Paine’s research and finding empirical support for her thesis).
365 See Anand et al., supra note 17; Cressey, supra note 249, at 15–16; Heath, supra note
17; see also Todd Haugh, Sentencing the Why of White Collar Crime, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3143,
3185 (2014) (discussing the role of rationalizations in sentencing and how judges can best
be educated about them).
366 Heath, supra note 17, at 611.
367 Id.
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ups, it is the best way to demonstrate the inadequacy of rationalizations.368
For example, all compliance programs should enable periodic employee
meetings wherein the employees, as opposed to human resources or compli-
ance personnel, trace out the harms of embezzlement, articulate the logic of
an industry regulation, or explain how market failures such as monopolies
produce inferior products.369  When rationalizations arise, they should be
drawn out and explored.  The goal is to raise “conscious awareness [of] cer-
tain patterns of self-exculpatory reasoning, and to flag them as suspicious,” so
that employees will be less likely to internalize that reasoning when presented
with an opportunity to do so.370
Some companies have employed these strategies to strengthen their
compliance programs.  BestBuy recently hosted a public website where its
chief ethics officer related emerging ethical dilemmas within the com-
pany.371  The web posts discussed how anonymous employees considered
ethics and compliance issues, sought advice from superiors and coworkers,
possibly took a wrong turn or two, but ultimately resolved the issue posi-
tively.372  Aside from conveying company rules and norms, what made
BestBuy’s approach so compelling was its incorporation of behavioral
insights.  Instead of lecturing employees or creating more rules to govern
their conduct, the posts wove in “accessible commentaries on recent research
in the behavioral science of ethics,” offering brief lessons on reoccurring eth-
ical traps, including the dangers of the “everyone does it” rationalization.373
BestBuy replaced the tools of criminalized compliance with ones focused on
the behavioral realities of its employees.374
368 See Lambsdorff, supra note 213, at 10 (discussing the difficulty companies have
adopting behavioral-driven compliance measures because they are less easily quantifiable).
369 Heath, supra note 17, at 611.  The size of the employee discussion groups is impor-
tant.  “If businesses want to develop cultures of trust where people are habitually being
honest and habitually keeping promises, they need to put employees into small ‘mediating
structures’ within the company that matches with their neurobiology.” TIMOTHY L. FORT,
THE VISION OF THE FIRM: ITS GOVERNANCE, OBLIGATIONS, AND ASPIRATIONS 231, 233 (2014)
(emphasis omitted) (discussing research suggesting we are hardwired to tell ethical stories
and build trust in small groups of four to six).
370 Heath, supra note 17, at 611. But see Murphy, supra note 22, at 23–28 (raising the
concern that statements made as part of compliance training and investigation could be
used against the company in litigation and citing Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F.
Supp. 259, 330 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (using compliance training notes against company to
determine punitive damages)).
371 Killingsworth, supra note 238, at 983.
372 Id.
373 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  This describes the claim-of-relative-accepta-
bility rationalization in layman’s terms. See COLEMAN, supra note 252, at 197.
374 Parsons Corporation, an international engineering and construction firm, uses a
slightly different yet equally effective strategy, publishing “Ethics Challenges” on its inter-
nal website.  The company solicits employee votes on how an ethics hypothetical should be
resolved, publishes the narrative comments anonymously, and then follows up with a
detailed analysis by the company’s ethics committee, which includes behavioral analyses.
Id.
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When a company facilitates the preemptive “reversing” of rationaliza-
tions by its employees, the compliance regime not only combats the psycho-
logical mechanisms that allow white collar and corporate crime, but it also
builds genuine legitimacy with those subject to it.  While this compliance strat-
egy is admittedly modest, it has the great strength of being focused on
employee impact as opposed to the precepts of the criminal law.  As such, it
provides a compliance program the chance of becoming more than just
words on a page or a list of company rules—it provides an opportunity for
that program to truly become “the world’s best.”375
375 Yoffie & Kwak, supra note 1, at 120.  This, of course, does not mean that the tradi- R
tional tools of compliance, including monitoring and enforcement, should be ignored.
Understanding the limits of criminalized compliance and the benefits of “behavioral com-
pliance” strategies is not about eliminating necessary controls, but about doing compliance
better—a goal all should share. See Jeff Kaplan, Behavioral Anti-Corruption Compliance and Its
Limits, CONFLICT OF INT. BLOG (Jan. 16, 2016), http://conflictofinterestblog.com/2016/
01/behavioral-anti-corruption-compliance-and-its-limits.html.
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